



Photo by Midia Ninja

# UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY

A PORTRAIT OF BRAZILIAN  
INEQUALITIES

2021



**OXFAM**  
Brasil

[www.oxfam.org.br](http://www.oxfam.org.br)

---

## STAFF

This report was written by Jefferson Nascimento and coordinated by Maitê Gauto and Katia Maia. It is the result of an effort that involved Oxfam Brasil's team and included contributions from several researchers and experts.

Special thanks to Anielle Franco, Arthur Welle, Cristiano Rodrigues, Danusa Marques, Erika Hilton, Gustavo Ferroni, Jorge Cordeiro, Luana Passos, Maitê Gauto, Marina Barros, Michelle Ferreti, Natália Neris, Nathalie Beghin, Oscar Vilhena, Pedro Herculano Guimarães Ferreira de Souza, Rafael Georges, Roberta Eugênio, Samantha Federici, Tauá Pires, Viviane Gonçalves and Wânia Sant'Anna.

### Proofreading and Editing

Eros Camel | © Camel Press

### Graphic Design and Layout

Brief Comunicação

Published August 9, 2021

*This report and other Oxfam Brasil works are possible as a result of our donors' support. To contribute any amount, visit [doe.oxfam.org.br/desigualadadenao](https://doe.oxfam.org.br/desigualadadenao)*



/oxfambrasil

# UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY

---

A PORTRAIT OF BRAZILIAN  
INEQUALITIES  
**2021**



**OXFAM**  
Brasil



# CONTENTS

<b>PREFACE</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>PART 1: DEMOCRACY AND INEQUALITIES</b>	<b>13</b>
THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN COMBATING INEQUALITIES	15
<b>PART 2: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>20</b>
Voting and the right to suffrage (1822-2019)	21
Political Participation and Inclusion	24
<b>SOCIAL PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>26</b>
Public Policy Councils	27
Conferences and Participatory Budgeting	29
<b>RECENT ATTACKS ON SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL'S INEQUALITIES</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>PART 3: DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>CAMPAIGN DONATIONS AND ECONOMIC POWER</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>GENDER REPRESENTATION</b>	<b>38</b>
Federal Representation	38
Representation at State and Municipal Levels	42
Representation at Municipal Level	44
<b>REPRESENTATION OF BLACK AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE</b>	<b>46</b>
Representation at Federal Level	47
Representation at State and Municipal Levels	49
Obstacles to Access Black and Indigenous Candidacies	51
<b>2020 ELECTIONS: INCREMENTAL PROGRESS IN REPRESENTATION BUT A LONG WAY TO GO</b>	<b>54</b>
Unprecedented Majority of Black Candidates and the Largest Number of Women Candidates in History	54
Collective Candidacies: Diversity and Multiplicity	57
Elected candidates: incremental progress but a long way to go	58
<b>ELECTORAL REFORM 2021: RISK OF SETBACKS</b>	<b>60</b>
District-Based Elections	61
Reserved Seats for Women and the End of Gender Quotas	62
<b>PART 4: PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>THE BLACK LETTER: THE POLITICS WE WANT</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>ABOUT OXFAM BRASIL</b>	<b>79</b>

## PREFACE

The year 2020 was marked by a global epidemic that deeply affected social and interpersonal relations around the world. In Brazil, in addition to the tragedy of thousands of families who lost their loved ones to the novel coronavirus, the pandemic has exposed multiple inequalities in the economic, social, political and health care spheres. The economic crisis that had started in 2015 was exacerbated by the pandemic and has been addressed through fiscal austerity measures from the start. That includes Constitutional Amendment 95/2016 (Expenditure Ceiling), which has impacted the country's budget for public social policies that played a crucial role in reducing inequality indicators in the first decade and a half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

While millions struggle to survive in a scenario of uncertainty, a few hundred people thrive on business opportunities arising from the Covid-19 crisis. According to the third Oxfam Brasil/Datafolha opinion survey, almost nine out of ten Brazilians believe that the country's progress depends on bridging the gap between rich and poor. Furthermore, 85% of Brazilians understand that it is governments' duty to reduce that gap. Gender and race inequalities are also perceived by the population, as 62% recognize that women are paid less because they are women and 58% understand that black people earn lower wages because they are black.

Such mismatch between social perceptions about inequalities and the measures adopted by the country's political establishment – such as fiscal austerity and the exceptional character of last year's social protection measures – is rooted in under-representation of social groups that are demographic majorities but political minorities, especially women and black people. Political inequality has an impact on economic inequality, which is worsened as decision-making elites keep failing to respond to the demands of their diverse constituencies.

In 2017, Oxfam Brasil portrayed our country's inequalities through data on income, assets and distribution of essential services. The report **Inequalities in Brazil: The divide that unites us** covered six important topics in the fight against inequalities: the tax system, social spending, education, discrimination, the labour market and access to democracy.

In 2018, this debate was resumed and further expanded through the analysis of data from the time series on income and assets, and the discussion on taxation and social spending. **Stagnant Country** showed how the process of reducing inequalities stagnated while a regressive fiscal policy was adopted, with effects on income distribution.

This report – **Unfinished Democracy: A portrait of Brazilian inequalities** – looks into relations between inequalities and democracy, shedding light on participation and representation as essential factors to carry out constitutional commands for a fairer and more egalitarian society in our country.

As underscored by several studies, adopting inclusive public social policies is the most effective means to combat inequalities, especially in a context that combines economic and health crises. Inequality in political representation has to be tackled in order to enable black people and women to expand their presence and their participation in decision-making and power spaces and to mitigate the effects of political under-representation of more vulnerable social strata and groups – the hardest hit in periods of crisis – and those who have the least means for politically advancing their demands in complex contexts.

With this report, Oxfam Brasil intends to contribute to the debate on the elements that prevent an adequate response to the representation gap between the elite and the vast majority of the population excluded from the power club. The first fundamental goals of the Federative Republic of Brazil as set in Article 3 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 include building a free, fair and solidarity-based society and guaranteeing national development by eradicating poverty and marginalization and reducing social and regional inequalities. In a context of economic and health crisis, the country's current decision makers must urgently be held accountable for these goals.

More justice, less inequalities!

**Katia Maia**

Executive director

**Hélio Santos**

Chair of the Deliberative Council





Pro-democracy demonstration  
in Brazil, held in Rio de Janeiro,  
January, 2018.

Photo: Tania Rego/Agência Brasil



# **INTRODUCTION**

The debate on inequalities is the order of the day in Brazil. The economic crisis that started in 2015 interrupted the downtrend in income inequality. In 2018, Oxfam Brasil pointed out that the country saw its income distribution stagnate for the first time since the early 2000s.<sup>1</sup> In the following years, as the economic crisis continued and fiscal austerity policies reduced social spending, that scenario deteriorated as a result of higher unemployment and interruption of policies such as real raises in the minimum wage.<sup>2</sup> Austerity policies, such as Constitutional Amendment 95/2016 (Expenditure Ceiling) and labour reform, took little account of their impacts on highly vulnerable social groups, e.g. higher demand for public services and labour precarisation.

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), based on data from 2018, Brazil was the eighth most unequal country in the world, in addition to being the top one outside the African continent.<sup>3</sup> Data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)<sup>4</sup> on the same year show that income inequality has reached its peak since 2012. The richest 10% in the country earned 13 times more than the poorest 40%. Income concentration as measured by the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) started to increase again in Brazil in 2018, after many years of reduction. Black women, black men and women in general, who are the majority at the base of Brazil's social pyramid, continue to suffer most. Poverty and extreme poverty are on the rise for the fifth consecutive year and, in 2018, Brazil was technically back on the UN Hunger Map, with more than of 5% of its population experiencing severe food insecurity.

In this context, the government of Jair Bolsonaro eliminated 93% of the participatory policy councils linked to the federal administration – a clear attack on participation, transparency and social control over public policies. That included councils that used to address topics such as food safety, decent labour, drug policies, people with disabilities, Social Security and Welfare, elderly people, LGBTQIA+, and indigenous policies.

Then came the Covid-19 pandemic. The worst health crisis in recent decades exposed and increased inequalities in Brazil, pointing to a scenario where social and economic indicators tend to worsen, even after the adoption of emergency income transfer measures that contained the escalation of inequalities in 2020.<sup>5</sup> At the end of the year, 116.8 million people – 55% of Brazil's population – experienced food insecurity conditions and 19.1 million or 9% faced hunger – the worst figure since 2004.<sup>6</sup> As a result of the pandemic, nearly 8 million jobs have disappeared, meaning that, for the first time, less than half of the working age population are employed.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, there were also municipal elections in 2020, placing the challenges of inequality in political representation in Brazil on the agenda of public debate as a structural obstacle to more inclusive and effective public policies to respond to the urgent demands of the most vulnerable groups and the increase in inequalities.

With the Federal Constitution of 1988, unprecedented expansion of the right to suffrage, in addition to inclusion of millions of citizens previously left out of the electoral process – for example, illiterate people – enabled a large portion of the population to effectively choose their representatives and participate in public decisions with important consequences for their lives and futures. Besides providing for universal public services, such democratic advances represented undeniable progress towards a fairer and more egalitarian society in Brazil. However, such measures of undoubted impact on reducing inequality have been limited in practice by political representation that does not mirror the population. As a result, a predominantly male, white and rich political group has a disproportionate influence on the country's political agenda.


Reducing inequalities in Brazil requires a new public policy paradigm, focusing on more vulnerable groups to allow for the creation of the necessary conditions for fairer economic and social recovery. To achieve that, reducing unequal political representation is essential to rebalance distribution of political power and foster a more equitable decision-making environment.

Given the importance of participation and political representation issues for an efficient strategy to reduce inequalities, Oxfam Brasil launches its report **Unfinished Democracy: a Portrait of Brazilian inequalities**.

The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed national inequalities. Mitigating its impacts and resuming the trajectory of reducing inequalities require effective representative democratic institutions, ensuring participation of women and black people's demographic majorities – and political minorities – in addition to allowing the creation and implementation of social public policies committed to a fair and solidarity-based society.

This report is divided into four parts.<sup>8</sup> **Part 1** presents a brief discussion about the role of democracy in combating inequalities. **Part 2** discusses participation in a democratic society, while **Part 3** debates political representation in Brazil, analysing how weaker participatory spaces and under-representation of demographic majorities and vulnerable groups undermine policies that would help reducing inequalities. Finally, in **Part 4**, we propose a working agenda based on these topics, aiming for a country with more justice and less inequalities.





Promulgation of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution in the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies, in Brasília.

Photo: Agência Brasil



**PART 1:**  
**DEMOCRACY AND**  
**INEQUALITIES**

Brazilian history is deeply marked by inequalities, reflecting a past of colonial expropriation and the barbarism of slavery. For a long time, a census-based voting policy was adopted in the country, restricting full formal participation by women and homeless people in elections until the late 1940s, and by illiterate people until 1985. The electoral system is still incomplete; for example, it restricts electoral participation of people with criminal convictions.<sup>9</sup> Patrimonialistic practices capable of crystallizing private interests above public ones are inseparable from a scenario of endemic inequality that completely prevents consolidation of a more democratic, fair and egalitarian society.

“All power emanates from the people, who exercise it through their elected representatives or directly,” says Brazil’s Federal Constitution in its Article 1, enshrining a vision of society based on the Democratic Rule of Law, supported by the expansion of the right to suffrage and the recognition of the relevance of citizen participation in making, implementing and exercising social control over public policies.<sup>10</sup> As a result, millions of people previously excluded from important public policies began to benefit from broader access to health care, education and social assistance, with a major impact on reducing inequality. That process gained momentum in the early 2000s, with the increase in social investments throughout different governments. The result: a decade and a half of continuous decline in inequality indicators.

How could 15 years of reducing inequalities based on constitutional parameters applied by governments of different strands be reversed so quickly – and why is it that such reduction cannot be resumed after half a decade? How did broad social strata excluded from public policies before the Federal Constitution of 1988 manage to make themselves heard for decades but have been powerless to curb the widening income gap between rich and poor since 2015?

In a deep economic and health crisis in a country founded on a racist and sexist social, political and economic structure, a more representative political system committed to generating inclusive public policies is essential to create and guarantee conditions for the full exercise of rights and access to basic services that are crucial to resuming reduction of poverty and inequality.

At the heart of this debate, we must stress that gender and race inequalities structure political representation inequality in Brazil. What is the current context and what needs to be done to ensure more political participation to women and black people?

In this part of the report, we will discuss the link between democracy and inequalities – an agenda that will be further expanded upon in the following sections, which debate the role of participation and representation in building a fairer and more egalitarian society.



## THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN COMBATING INEQUALITIES

Is democracy a condition for reducing inequalities? Was Brazil able to bridge the gap between rich and poor under authoritarian regimes?

Many studies have focused on the relationship between democracy and inequality, seeking to establish causality between democratic regimes and creation of egalitarian societies. Even though there is no final answer to that question, some researchers have mapped variations in income concentration since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Brazil.

Drawing on nearly nine decades of tax data, Pedroerculano Guimarães Ferreira de Souza undertook the most complete analysis of the variation in income concentration at the top of the Brazilian social pyramid, which centralizes a considerable portion of national income.<sup>11</sup> Comparing political cycles with variations in the share of income amassed by the richest, Souza sought connections between the two fields, assuming that income concentration at the top of the pyramid has an inertial nature and that significant and lasting changes in inequality tend to occur in times of crisis and rupture.<sup>12</sup>

Souza found three periods of rapid increase in inequality in Brazil:<sup>13</sup> a) the end of the so-called Old Republic and the New State, between 1926 and 1945; b) the beginning of the 1964 military dictatorship; and c) during times of hyperinflation resulting from the economic and political crisis of the 1980s.

In the first period, which comprises the end of the Old Republic and President Getúlio Vargas's New State (*Estado Novo*), the earnings of the richest 1% jumped from 20% to 28% of the national income, with a peak of 30% between 1942 and 1943.<sup>14</sup> In Vargas's dictatorship, repression and authoritarianism coexisted with accommodation of interests and pressures from the richest portion of the population – in parallel to the expansion of the State's social bases and coherent with stable stratification of society at the time.<sup>15</sup> Part of that period coincides with World War II (1939-1945), when the crisis in rich countries and the need for social mobilization catalysed

structural changes that impacted income redistribution and consolidation of more egalitarian social policies in those countries.<sup>16</sup>

**DEMOCRACY DEPENDS ON THE EXISTENCE OF A CERTAIN STANDARD OF EQUALITY AMONG CITIZENS, WITHOUT WHICH GROUPS WITH MORE ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND INFORMATION WILL EXERCISE DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Professor at Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) Law School, São Paulo

In Brazil, on the contrary, the low social and economic impact of World War II provided advantages to certain sectors – such as meat, cotton and coffee industries, as well as other areas affected by the war in the United States and European countries – enabling the expansion of exports and higher income concentration at the top.<sup>17</sup> Thus, a business-oriented developmentalist project consolidated, including restrictions on labour rights for “war industries” from 1942 on.<sup>18</sup>

During the 1964-1985 civil-military dictatorship in Brazil, income concentration increased at the top, reversing the downward trend observed in the two previous decades.<sup>19</sup> Policies that contributed to that reduction included the 1954 100% raise in the minimum wage by then President João Goulart, a former Minister of Labour under Getúlio Vargas who was removed from office after that increase. That had been only the second raise in the minimum wage since the 1943 freeze.

In the first years of the dictatorship started in 1964, the earnings of the richest 1% rose from 17%-19% of the national income in the early 1960s to 26% in 1971 – the highest figure since the peak of the early 1940s – and closed the 1970s around 25%.<sup>20</sup>

The adoption of measures favouring capital gains over labour – including a restrictive wage policy responsible for a 30% reduction in the real value of the minimum wage between 1964 and 1974,<sup>21</sup> repression of unions and other social movements, and favouring high-ranking executives of large corporations<sup>22</sup> – illustrates the social and economic policies adopted by the authoritarian regime that contributed to increase inequality in that period. Those policies would not have been easily approved in a democratic context<sup>23</sup> since they would face opposition from labour and student social movements, among others that had flourished in the years prior to the 1964 institutional rupture.


During the 1980s, transition to democracy took place in the context of serious economic crisis and higher imbalance in Brazil’s economy, accelerated by the effects of the second oil crisis in 1979.<sup>24</sup> Ineffective attempts at economic stabilization and the resulting hyperinflation, which catapulted wealth concentration on the richest 1% to more than 30% of national income – close to the historic peak of the 1940s<sup>25</sup> – contributed to increase inequality in the country, in a period that would be known as the “lost decade.”<sup>26</sup>

**PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS  
WILL TEND TO  
REINFORCE INEQUALITY  
MECHANISMS AND  
DEMOCRACY WILL  
DEGENERATE UNTIL IT  
ENTERS INTO A CRISIS.  
THEREFORE, IT CAN BE  
SAID THAT, WITHOUT A  
MINIMUM STANDARD OF  
EQUALITY, DEMOCRACY  
WILL ALWAYS BE  
INCOMPLETE AS IT WILL  
NOT BE ABLE TO REFLECT  
THE INTERESTS OF ALL  
ACTORS IN SOCIETY  
EQUALLY**

Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Professor at Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) Law School, São Paulo




### Fraction of the richest 1% and Gini coefficient corrected by tax data – Brazil, 1926-2013



Source: SOUZA, Pedro Herculano Guimarães Ferreira de. 2018. A history of inequality: Top incomes in Brazil, 1926-2015. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 57, 35-45.

The analysis of the three periods of higher inequality points to a connection between more democracy and less inequality. However, while in the Brazilian case – and worldwide, see Chile from 1973 onwards and Germany in the 1930s – dictatorship times are often associated with more inequality, periods of (re)democratization do not always display indicators of fairer and more egalitarian societies.<sup>27</sup> Examples of countries that became more egalitarian during dictatorships or more unequal under democracy indicate that the political system alone does not explain variations in income concentration. Therefore, the public policies adopted in those periods should be examined.<sup>28</sup>

In order to assess democracy’s potential for reducing inequalities, we have to analyse how egalitarian the political system itself is. A democracy based on deep political inequality will not be able to effectively combat social and economic inequality. And, in order to talk about political inequality, we must look at participation and representation – topics that are covered in the next sections of this report.



Voting procedure about indigenous rights during a plenary session of the National Constituent Assembly, in Brasília.

Photo: Leopoldo Silva/Agência Senado

**PART 2:**  
**DEMOCRACY AND**  
**PARTICIPATION**

In order to speak about democracy and inequalities, we have to analyse popular participation in Brazil. As discussed in Part 1, while authoritarian regimes can be associated with more inequality, democracy does not necessarily guarantee equality, and the type and impact of public policies adopted in each period have to be examined in order to understand that dynamic.

Therefore, restrictions on popular participation that are typical of authoritarian regimes tend to favour policies that increase inequality by driving political imbalance between more vulnerable and privileged social groups. Concentration of political power in the hands of political and economic elite creates conditions for the State to be captured and used to favour their interests<sup>29</sup> – a phenomenon that will be proportional to the limitation on popular participation in decision-making.

## ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

Brazil's Federal Constitution of 1988 emphasizes electoral participation in its chapter on political rights – Article 14 establishes that the sovereignty of the people shall be exercised by universal suffrage and by direct and secret voting, with equal value for all. Understanding the power to elect, be elected and participate in the organization and activity of State power as citizens' subjective public right, universal suffrage is a fundamental principle of Brazilian political democracy, founded on identification between rulers and ruled.<sup>30</sup> Voting, in turn, is the political act that results from exercising the right to elect one's representatives and, in the current Brazilian constitutional order, it is direct, secret and of equal value for all, that is, each voter of both sexes has the right to cast one vote in each election and for each type of office.<sup>31</sup>

## BRAZIL'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1988, ARTICLE 14

The sovereignty of the people shall be exercised by universal suffrage and by direct and secret voting, with equal value for all, and, according to the law, by means of:

- I – plebiscite;
- II – referendum;
- III – people's initiative.

This arrangement, which represents the highest degree of electoral participation ever achieved in Brazil, was preceded by considerable changes in terms of who holds the right to suffrage, not only influencing the democratic nature of the country's political regimes but also indicating the outlines of political inequality in Brazil



## Voting and the right to suffrage (1822-2019)

During the Brazilian Empire (1822-1889), the 1824 Constitution established that voting was mandatory for all men aged 25 or older with minimum income of 100 mil-réis<sup>32</sup>. Women did not vote, nor did enslaved people, who were not considered citizens. Freedmen could vote in primary elections. There was no limitation on the vote of illiterate people (about 85% of the population) as long as the other criteria were met. Elections took place in two stages: in primaries, voters chose electors (who had to meet the common criteria but should have a minimum income of 200 mil-réis); in secondary elections, the chosen electors would vote for city councillors, deputies and senators. Then actual Senators were chosen by the emperor from a list of the three most-voted candidates, for lifetime terms. City councillors and deputies were elected for four-year terms. Provincial presidents – the equivalent to today’s state governors – were appointed by the central government. According to the 1872 Census, 13% of the population could vote, not counting enslaved people. That number reached about 50% of the adult male population in 1881.<sup>33</sup> While formal suffrage was relatively liberal during the Brazilian Empire by the standards of the time,<sup>34</sup> in practice the electoral process was marked by lack of freedom to vote, control by political leaders, fraud and corruption.<sup>35</sup>

Political leaders’ pressure on voters – that is, on those who would choose the electors – led to an electoral reform in 1881, establishing direct voting but raising the minimum census threshold to 200 mil-réis and excluding illiterate people – only 15% of the population could read and write. As a result, the number of voters decreased by 90% in the 1886 elections, a restriction of electoral participation that went in the opposite direction to what was taking place in other countries, which would have consequences in the following decades.<sup>36</sup>

With the proclamation of the Republic in 1889, after slavery had been abolished by the so-called Golden Law (*Lei Áurea*) in the previous year, the right to suffrage provided in the 1891 Constitution followed the parameters of the 1881 electoral reform, with elections for state presidents and the end of the census-based criterion. However, the

restriction on women and illiterate people’s right to vote was maintained – they were excluded for the sexist and exclusionary reason that they would be easily influenced and incapable of having their own ideas – in addition to homeless people, low-ranking members of the military and clergy leading cloistered lives.<sup>37</sup> Several mechanisms allowed for corruption in the electoral process, including fraud in vote counting, false voting records, and forged documents of dead voters, among others.<sup>38</sup>

In this scenario, the figure of the so-called colonels gained prominence. The expression referred to the highest rank of the National Guard, associated with the most politically influential people in town. With the end of the military character of the National Guard, the term started to be used to refer to local political leaders, who operated in alliance with state presidents and the President of the Republic – an oligarchic arrangement that tarnished the integrity of the electoral process.<sup>39</sup>

The end of the Old Republic and the rise of Getúlio Vargas to power in 1930 caused new changes in the right to suffrage. That year, about 5.6% of the population voted – 1.8 million Brazilians.<sup>40</sup> The 1932 Electoral Code and the 1934 Constitution gave women the right to vote as long as they worked outside their homes and reduced the minimum voting age to 18. Illiterate people, housewives, low-ranking military, the homeless and those deprived of political rights were still excluded from the electoral process.<sup>41</sup> The Electoral Court and the secret ballot were created as measures to combat fraud.

The New State (*Estado Novo*, 1937-1945) dictatorship put an end to Brazilian citizens’ political rights, totally restricting political participation. As a result, all elective offices were eliminated and the central government chose governors and mayors. Parliaments were closed at federal, state and municipal levels.

With re-democratization in 1945 and the promulgation of the 1946 Constitution, Brazil had its first democratic experience ever, with the establishment of several political parties in an environment of growing participation and social mobilization.<sup>42</sup> Political rights were restored, with few changes compared to the model prior to the New State: the restriction on homeless voters was eliminated but illiterate people were still excluded from the electoral process; in 1950, they accounted for approximately 50% of the Brazilian population over 18.<sup>43</sup>

The right to suffrage enabled people to choose the President, senators, federal deputies, governors, state deputies, mayors and city councillors in regular elections that were held for nearly two decades. The portion of the population that could vote increased significantly in the period, from 13.4% in 1945 to 15.9% in 1950 and to 18% in 1960, when the number of voters reached 12,5 million. Two years later, in 1962, in the last elections before the 1964 coup, 18.5 million Brazilians or about 26% of the country's population could vote.<sup>44</sup>

With the military coup of 1964, the right to suffrage and the possibility to vote were cancelled. Mayors of state capitals and other strategic cities were appointed by governors who, in turn, were indirectly chosen by state parliaments (known as Legislative Assemblies). The President was no longer elected directly, but rather by an Electoral College. Limitations on electoral participation are examples of authoritarian measures of the period, which included the removal of elected officials from their offices,<sup>45</sup> closing Congress, political banishment/exile, arrests, torture, murders and forced disappearances. Direct elections for state governors were re-established in 1982. Two years later, Constitutional Amendment Dante de Oliveira, which re-established direct elections for President, served as a standard for the Direct Elections Now! campaign (*Diretas Já*), which mobilized large segments of society between 1983 and 1984 to demand full reestablishment of the right to suffrage, even though the bill was defeated in Congress.<sup>46</sup>

The so-called New Republic started in 1985 when Vice-President elect José Sarney's took office as President after Tancredo Neves was indirectly elected but died before inauguration. The period saw advances in electoral legislation, including direct – and exceptional – elections for mayor in 1985, illiterate people's right to vote, non-mandatory right to vote for people over 16, and direct elections for President in 1989. The importance not only of fully re-establishing the right to vote but also expanding it to groups historically excluded from the electoral process was one of the main topics in the 1987 Constituent Assembly. The debate would consolidate the universal right to suffrage and direct and secret ballot, which were enshrined in the 1988 Federal Constitution.

## Vote and suffrage in Brazil

PERIOD	WHO COULD VOTE	WHO COULD NOT VOTE	FIGURES
<b>Brazilian Empire (1822-1889)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men</li> <li>Minimum age: 25</li> <li>Minimum income: 100 mil-réis (after 1881: 200 mil-réis)</li> <li>Illiterate people (until 1881)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women</li> <li>Enslaved people</li> </ul>	<p>1875: 11% of the population (1.1 million)</p>
<b>Old Republic (1889-1930)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men</li> <li>Minimum age: 21 years old</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women</li> <li>Illiterate people</li> </ul>	<p>1894: 2,2% of the population (315 thousand)</p> <p>1905: 4% of the population (791 thousand)</p> <p>1912: 5% of the population (1.29 million)</p>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Vargas Government and New State (<i>Estado Novo</i>) (1930-1945)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men (until 1937)</li> <li>Single women or widows doing paid work; married women could vote as long as their husbands authorized it (until 1937)</li> <li>Minimum age: 18 (until 1937)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Illiterate people</li> <li>Homeless people</li> <li>Low-ranking members of the military</li> <li>Persons deprived of political rights</li> <li>From 1937 on: end of political rights and restriction of the right to suffrage</li> </ul>	<p>1933: 3,9% of the population (1.44 million)</p> <p>1934: 7% of the population (2.66 million)</p>
<b>Liberal Republic (1945-1964)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men and women</li> <li>Minimum age: 18</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Illiterate people</li> </ul>	<p>1945: 13.4% of the population</p> <p>1950: 15.9% of the population (8.23 million)</p> <p>1960: 18% of the population (12.5 million)</p>
<b>Military Dictatorship (1964-1985)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men and women</li> <li>Minimum age: 18</li> <li>Vote for city councillors, mayors (except capitals and strategic cities), deputies, senators and governors (from 1982)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Illiterate people</li> <li>Restriction of vote for President, indirectly chosen by Congress</li> </ul>	<p>1970 (Senado Federal): 23.7% of the population (22.4 million)</p> <p>1982 (governos estaduais): 48.7 million</p>
<b>New Republic (From 1985 onwards)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men and women</li> <li>Minimum age: 18</li> <li>Illiterate people (optional)</li> <li>Optional for young people aged 16-18 and people over 70</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Immigrants</li> <li>Refugees</li> <li>People criminally convicted with final decisions, while effects last</li> </ul>	<p>1986: 47% of the population (53 million)</p> <p>2020: 70% of the population (147.9 million) able to vote</p>

Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

The expansion of the right to suffrage to its historical peak under the 1988 Federal Constitution is a democratic achievement with important consequences for reducing inequalities. This new political stage in the country enabled the inclusion of millions of people who had been

excluded from the electoral process – as was the case, for example, with illiterate people until 1985<sup>47</sup> – and added nationality to citizenship, giving the overwhelming majority of the population the opportunity to choose their representatives.


## Political Participation and Inclusion

From 1988 onwards, the inclusion of social strata previously removed from political representation was followed by high electoral participation rates, including the poorest.<sup>48</sup> This population began to vote for policies that favoured them, based on the extensive list of social rights provided for in the 1988 Constitution. Thanks to its demographic weight, the vote of the poorest became decisive in elections for executive offices.<sup>49</sup>

As a result, parties from different political strands felt encouraged to converge around the demands of constituencies concentrated in the lowest five income deciles, resulting in implementation and strengthening of social policies such as expansion of public services and real income gains for the poorest.<sup>50</sup> Important events were the real raise in the minimum wage and related effects, such as payment of non-contributory pensions based on that value from 1988 onwards.<sup>51</sup>


The Federal Constitution of 1988 also extended social security and welfare benefits to the rural population, who had been limited to one person per family, with values that ranged from half a minimum wage (age-based retirement after 65 and lifetime monthly income after 70) to three quarters of a minimum wage (disability pension). After 1988, the criteria for the rural population were extended and the age to be eligible for the benefit was reduced (60 for men and 55 for women – five years lower than urban workers) and a benefit floor of one minimum wage, including pension, with equal access for men and women.<sup>52</sup>

Estimates indicate that 64.3% of the reduction in income inequality among households in 1995-2014 came from the policy of real raises in the minimum wage.<sup>53</sup>





### Real value of the minimum wage (1985-2021), adjusted by inflation for June 2021



Source: Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea) – IpeaData

This model based on increasing spending on social policies, whose impact on reducing inequality is well documented,<sup>54</sup> has been called into question after the economic crisis that began in 2015 started to worsen and was aggravated by fiscal austerity measures and the novel coronavirus pandemic. While inclusion-oriented policies softened the effects of economic crises,<sup>55</sup> economic austerity measures worked as obstacles to maintaining those policies.

In this context, political elites blame fiscal deficits on social spending focused on the most vulnerable groups. That strategy exempts those elites from the necessary debate about strengthening the State’s capacity to implement policies to reduce inequality, as is the case of a fair and progressive tax reform.<sup>56</sup>

## SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

A more comprehensive look at participation and democracy has to go beyond the exercise of the right to suffrage and vote.

Pointed out as spaces capable of reducing political inequalities, participatory institutions have expanded access for actors excluded from the traditional political process,<sup>57</sup> working as instruments of institutional pluralization of democracy.<sup>58</sup> By adopting hybrid models that include members of civil society and state actors,<sup>59</sup> those institutions have played an important role in making, executing and improving public policies in areas such as health care, social assistance, education and the environment, among others, with direct impact on reproducing or reducing inequalities.

While Brazil's first participation body dates back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>60</sup> participatory institutions gained momentum in the late 1970s, in a context of political opening after a time of increasing repression by the military dictatorship, started in 1968<sup>61</sup> and marked by strong control over freedom of association.<sup>62</sup> The development of participatory bodies was influenced by multiple factors, such as societal maturity on its view on rights, increasing number of civil associations, especially community-based ones, the advocacy of organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the State, the practice of publicly presenting demands and the exercise of dialogue with the State.<sup>63</sup>

These demands included participation spaces in which civil society could present its claims and influence policymaking processes and, thus, seek solutions to low-income urban classes' rampant deficit in social areas.<sup>64</sup>


This movement, which emerged in the late 1970s, gained momentum in the 1980s and influenced the Constitutional process, resulting in a Federal Constitution drawn up by a plurality of political forces and subjects, consolidating a set of principles and guidelines for citizen participation in the implementation and social control over public policies.<sup>65</sup>

## Public Policy Councils

Public policy councils emerge as an institutionalized model for citizen participation, created to operationalize the constitutional principles that aimed to provide Brazilian civil society with greater access to spaces for making, implementing and exercising social control over public policies.<sup>66</sup>

Focused on participation and decentralization — a characteristic of the social functions of the Federal Constitution of 1988 — public policy councils consolidated over five main characteristics: a) parity; b) deliberation; c) shared management; d) decentralization; and e) autonomous representation.


## Characteristics of Public Policy Councils



<sup>66</sup>Source: Ciconello (2008).

At the end of 2018, there were 40 national public policy councils or commissions in Brazil,<sup>67</sup> 75% of which had been created after the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988 and 45% between 2001 and 2016.<sup>68</sup> As for the legal bases for national councils, 40% were created by law, 35% by executive order, and 25% by other types of legislation.<sup>69</sup>

### Number of participatory councils according to year of creation (1911-2016)



**Source:** RIBEIRO, Jefferson Davidson Gomes et al. (2017). Representação da sociedade civil nos conselhos e comissões nacionais: relatório de pesquisa. Ipea, Brasília. Available at <https://bit.ly/3nX6Nuz>. Accessed July 29, 2021.

There is no consolidated information on state and municipal councils. Considering only the areas of education, culture, health care, social assistance, food security, and women’s rights, there were about 22,000 municipal councils, covering from 99% (health and social assistance) to 23.5% (women’s rights) of municipalities.<sup>70</sup> Since there are 5,570 City Councils – spaces of representative democracy par excellence – there are almost four times as many municipal participatory councils in the areas mentioned.

The councils have advisory powers, and more traditional ones – such as the national education and health councils – also have decision-making powers. Their prerogatives include approving budgets and monitoring areas of operation, preparing strategic plans and creating standards, sometimes with normative status.<sup>71</sup>

## Conferences and Participatory Budgeting

In addition to participatory councils, two other Brazilian institutional participatory spaces are worth mentioning: a) conferences; and b) participatory budgets (PBs).

Public policymaking conferences are complementary to councils and are held periodically. They are special spaces to define political agendas and set priorities that inform a given public policy for a previously defined period – usually until the next conference. More than mere events, conferences are bottom-up political processes. They start at municipal and state conferences that elect delegates at each level to the next conference, gathering thousands of people from across the country through debate and collective construction.<sup>72</sup> Conferences also play an important role in influencing parliamentary agenda.<sup>73</sup>

While national conferences date back to the early 1940s, they became widespread after the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988, driven by constitutional mandates for civil society participation in the areas of health care and social assistance.<sup>74</sup> By 2016, 154 national conferences had been held<sup>75</sup> – 109 of which between 1992 and 2016 (74 from 2003 to 2010).<sup>76</sup> From 1992 to 2012, there were 21 on health; 20 on minority groups' agendas; six on the environment; 22 on State, economy and development; 17 on education, culture, social assistance and sports; and 11 on human rights.<sup>77</sup>

Participatory Budgeting is a mechanism that enables citizens to participate in the debate and deliberation of part of the local public budget – an internationally recognized Brazilian participatory experience.<sup>78</sup> Originally adopted in Porto Alegre in 1989,<sup>79</sup> the PB model has spread all over the world: it is estimated that there are nearly 12,000 programs in 71 countries, according to the 2019 Participatory Budgeting World Atlas.<sup>80</sup> In 2016, Brazil had 436 local PB initiatives, which accounted for 3.7% of those existing globally. There are no more up-to-date data on Brazilian PBs, partly due to the inactivity of the Brazilian Participatory Budget Network and lack of accounting on existing experiences, a result of the crisis of PBs in the country since the 2016 municipal elections.<sup>81</sup>

The PB's model based on openness to action and engagement by civil society ended up influencing advocacy efforts in other budgeting processes, such as the Multi-Year Plans (PPA) from the mid-2000s onwards.<sup>82</sup>



## RECENT ATTACKS ON SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL'S INEQUALITIES

Elected President in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right politician, has based his administration on an agenda that opposes human rights, undermines social participation spaces, is insensible to social gaps – including vulnerable strata such as black people and women – and promotes a neoliberal vision of the economy that ignores the role of the State in guaranteeing social policies capable of reducing inequalities and providing better living conditions for all.


Even before his election, the then candidate declared his intention to put “an end to all activism in Brazil,”<sup>83</sup> causing more than 3,000 civil society movements and organizations to react.<sup>84</sup> After Bolsonaro was elected in April 2019, he issued Executive Order 9759/2019,<sup>85</sup> arbitrarily extinguishing or restricting participatory councils at federal level – including public policy councils and commissions – under the argument that the measure would cut “red tape” and save public money.<sup>86</sup>

In addition to extinguishing participatory bodies created by so-called sub-legal norms – including executive orders or lower normative acts such as those of other participatory councils – Bolsonaro’s Order revoked the National Policy for Social Participation (PNPS) and the National System for Social Participation (SNPS).<sup>87</sup> Although the Executive Order did not include traditional councils – such as the National Councils of Education, Health, Environment, Social Welfare, Human Rights and Women’s Rights – whose creation was based on federal laws, it cancelled participatory councils that worked on topics such as drug addiction, decent work, people with disabilities, social security, indigenous policy, public safety, internet use, and the rights of the elderly and the LGBTI population, among many others.

The arbitrary extinction of participatory bodies was also responsible for the end of the National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (Consea), which was essential in setting policies to combat hunger in Brazil.<sup>88</sup> Created in 1993, Consea was cancelled in 1995 during the first term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002),

when the Solidarity Community Program was created, and was reorganized in 2004 during the first administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. On the first day of Bolsonaro’s administration, Consea had its competences reduced<sup>89</sup> and ended up closed by Executive Order 9759/2019.

The National System for Food and Nutritional Security (Sisan), in which Consea played a crucial role,<sup>90</sup> was decisive in the fight against hunger in Brazil.<sup>91</sup> The success of that work led the country to leave the United Nations Hunger Map in 2014,<sup>92</sup> when the portion of the population facing severe food insecurity was reduced to 3.4%. The end of Consea coincides with the increase in hunger, poverty and extreme poverty in Brazil,<sup>93</sup> having been the object of concern by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in a report on the situation of human rights in the country released in July 2021.<sup>94</sup>



In addition to cancelling participatory councils, the Bolsonaro government's strategy of reducing social participation also involved undermining the structure and activities of national councils created by law – which cannot be extinguished by Executive Orders. Cases in point are the changes in the structure of the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (Conanda)<sup>95</sup> and the National Council for the Environment (Conama).

As the main advisory body of the Ministry of the Environment, Conama is responsible for establishing licensing criteria and standards to control and maintain environmental quality. Conama had its members reduced from 96 to 22, with a proportional increase in participation by federal government officials (from 29.5% to 41%) and a consequent decrease in the number of civil society representatives (from 22% to 18%).

The changes also affected the way Conama members are selected: election with sector-based voting to guarantee free choice of representatives was replaced with random draw, putting an end to regional representation, among others.<sup>96</sup> A concrete example of Conama's undermining was the repeal of regulations that restricted deforestation in mangroves and marshes,<sup>97</sup> compromising the protection of those important biomes. To approve the measure, the federal government took advantage of its increased decision-making power in the council.<sup>98</sup> In October 2020, that measure was suspended by a preliminary order granted by Supreme Court Justice Rosa Weber.<sup>99</sup>

**THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR FOOD AND NUTRITIONAL SECURITY (CONSEA) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PROGRESS IN THE DIALOGUE ABOUT THE POLICY FOR FIGHTING HUNGER IN BRAZIL AND WEAKENING IT MAY HAVE IRREPARABLE CONSEQUENCES IN A COUNTRY THAT IS CURRENTLY FACING SURGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY, AND EXTREME POVERTY**

IACHR (2021), Par. 427.




Erika Hilton, black trans woman and most voted female councilor in Brazil in 2020, elected to the Sao Paulo's City Council.

Photo: Afonso Braga

**PART 3:**  
**DEMOCRACY AND  
REPRESENTATION**


Under-representation of demographic majorities is a hallmark of Brazilian democracy. As seen in Part 2 of this report, closeness between economic power and political power has excluded women from effective participation in politics — they only gained full voting rights in the 1940s — and undermined the role of black people in spaces of power. That is the portrait of a society built on slavery and, even today, marked by structural racism.

### Share of people in each tenth of average regular income – by skin colour - 2019



Source: PNADC Annual – IBGE

### Share of people in each tenth of average regular income – by sex - 2019



Source: PNADC Annual – IBGE

As seen on the charts above, black women and people are the majority in the lowest income decile, while the opposite occurs with men and white people. The relationship is reversed as income increases. This scenario is repeated for political representation in Executive and Legislative offices at federal, state and municipal levels, indicating a persistent connection between economic power and political power: white men are the majority in the highest income deciles, which is reflected in the profiles of elected politicians across the country.

Next, we will discuss the role of economic power through campaign donations and the scenario of under-representation of women and black people, analysing the changes in the profiles of people elected to Legislative and Executive offices as well as the obstacles to increasing the presence of such important social strata in institutional political spaces.



## CAMPAIGN DONATIONS AND ECONOMIC POWER

In 2015, the so-called “Mini Electoral Reform”<sup>100</sup> banned campaign funding by companies, incorporating into the legislation the Federal Supreme Court’s (STF) decision made in the same year.<sup>101</sup> The Supreme Court Justices understood that businesses’ contributions to campaigns amounted to illicit capture of political power by economic power, compromising the normality and legality of elections.<sup>102</sup>

The 2015 Mini Electoral Reform, however, maintained the possibility of donations by individuals, setting a ceiling of 10% of one’s annual gross income as declared to the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service by the donor in the year prior to the election,<sup>103</sup> in addition to self-donations of up to 10% of the limits set for campaign expenses for the offices in question.<sup>104</sup>

Thus, in practice and in a slightly more restricted way, economic power can still capture political power even without corporate funding. Take the 2018 election as an example. The ten largest donors – leading businesspeople from companies in the energy, clothing, car rental, civil construction and food industries – donated R\$ 30.726 million, with an average of R\$ 3.072 million, spread over 228 donations with average value of R\$ 134,765.

## Top ten individual donors in Brazil’s 2018 elections



Source: Superior Electoral Court (TSE).

Businessman Rubens Ometto, chairman of the Board of energy and logistics conglomerate Cosan and a billionaire with a fortune estimated at R\$ 7 billion, topped the list by donating R\$ 7.55 million (1.37% of the total donated in 2018).<sup>105</sup> Considering the donation limit imposed on people with monthly incomes of one minimum wage that year (R\$ 11,448), Ometto alone donated the equivalent to 659 voters in the 2018 election. In that year, 25 out of 64 candidates who received donations from Ometto were elected.<sup>106</sup>

The 2015 Mini Electoral Reform also shortened the campaign period from 90 to 45 days for street campaigning and from 45 to 35 days for radio and TV. That reduction was justified as a way to reduce campaign costs, but shorter periods favour candidates who already have political and economic power, negatively impacting the possibility of renewing political representation.<sup>107</sup>

It is worth remembering that the Brazilian system of elections for Legislative offices adopts the open-list proportional model in which financial campaign expenses are essential to guarantee candidates' competitiveness because it gives them visibility. The model uses voters' preferences to set the order of candidates on the list. In proportional open list systems, political parties – and coalitions, when allowed – register a list without prior ordering, since voters will provide that order with their votes. By conditioning campaign donations on a percentage of individuals' annual gross incomes, Brazil's electoral legislation gives disproportionate political weight to the super-rich, which prevents broader representation of politically minority groups, as will be seen in the following sections.




## GENDER REPRESENTATION

### Federal Representation

Brazil is often mentioned as a negative example in terms of women’s presence in Parliament. On the international scene, it came 133<sup>rd</sup> in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) annual ranking on women in national parliaments, among 192 countries monitored in 2019.<sup>108</sup> As can be seen in the table below, the distance between Brazil and the regional average for the Americas is huge.

### Regional averages



Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).

In the 1990s, quota policies for women in politics were implemented throughout Latin America, influenced by the example of Argentina, which established them in 1991, and by the 4<sup>th</sup> World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995). Encouraged by international examples, Brazil

passed quotas for women in political parties’ and coalitions’ lists of candidates for legislative offices in 1995, through Law 9100/1995, introduced by then Federal Deputy Marta Suplicy.<sup>109</sup>

The bill set a 20% quote for women among parties' or coalitions' candidates running for city councillors. For the following elections, Electoral Law 9504/1997 increased the mandatory number of women candidates to 30%, with a transition period in the 1998 elections – when 25% of candidates should be women. While the measure was symbolically important, it had little impact on the political system – among other reasons, because of the strategies adopted by political parties to circumvent quotas. As an example of the lower-than-expected effect of quotas, the number of women elected to the Chamber of Deputies decreased after the measure: from 6.2% in 1994, in an election without quotas, to 5.7% in 1998, in the first election with quotas.

In Brazil, quotas reserve nominations rather than seats in parliament. In other words, the law establishes that parties must nominate a minimum of 30% of women candidates, but there is no control over the general target of affirmative policy, that is, the number of seats to be held by women. As the electoral system for parliamentary elections in Brazil is based on open lists, women candidates have been concentrated in low-vote positions in party lists since 1996 – an indication of their low competitiveness, with parties investing little in their candidacies.

Since 1995, political parties have circumvented the law on quotas for women in the electoral system – a practice that has been challenged in court and reinterpreted by the actions of activists and women in political parties. In 2010 alone, women were 22.7% of the candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, thanks to the 2009 Mini Electoral Reform, which forced parties to have at least 30% of female candidates. Before that, parties could not fulfil places on their lists as long as they did not give them to men. For the 2014 elections, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) decided that quotas apply to the whole of candidacies presented by a party/coalition rather than only to potential nominations, which contributed for women candidates eventually reach 29.1%.

In 2018 alone, 23 years after the approval of the so-called “Quota Law” (Law 9504/1997 or Elections Law), the number of female candidates to the Chamber of Deputies exceeded the legal floor and reached 32.1% as a result of numerous electoral reforms and growing court pressure for compliance with quotas. This record number of candidates, however, was not reflected in seats in parliament, where women remained as 15% of elected officials.


Over the last two decades, there have been several allegations of “women figurehead candidates” being launched by parties. Without any support for their campaigns, these women are nominated to comply with the Quota Law but have no chance of being actually elected to the Chamber of Deputies. In 2018, this practice gained even greater prominence with the strategy of tampering with party lists while diverting electoral funding resources.<sup>110</sup>

In 2018, the Superior Electoral Court determined that the Quota Law should also apply to financial and organizational resources for the elections (TSE Resolution 23575/2018), that is, to the Special Campaign Financing Fund (known as “Electoral Fund”) and to the distribution of each party's free time for electoral propaganda on radio and TV. At that time, there was redistribution not only in the formal presentation of candidates, but also in the funds necessary for a candidate to be competitive.

This change has been considered the main factor for the increase of five percentage points in the number of women elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2018. The electoral Court's decision is based on the idea that, in a proportional electoral system of open lists and a highly fragmented party system (in the 2018 elections, 30 parties elected representatives to the Chamber of Deputies), with low public control (with parties mostly controlled by male and white leaders), the Quota Law will only take effect if financial and organizational resources are provided to women candidates to make them more competitive.

Given this scenario, even with 77 women elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2018 – the highest number in history – 85% of elected federal deputies are men.


### Female and male federal deputies



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

Discrepancy is similar In the Federal Senate, even though the Quota Law does not apply in that case. In the 2018 election for 54 seats, only seven women were elected (13%) – the lowest number since 1998. In the previous election (2014), women were 18.5% of elected candidates, the highest number recorded so far. In 2018, only 12.9% were women, in an election that renewed two-thirds of the Chamber. When analysing female presence in that election, women were 15.3% of candidates for senator, but 23.7% of first substitutes and 29.7% of second substitutes, that is, they were in secondary positions. Today, only 10 out of 81 senators are women.

### Female and male senators (%)




Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.



## Representation at State and Municipal Levels


At state level, women’s electoral status is very low. As happens at federal level, there are few female state deputies. The national average is 15.4% and, in the 2018 elections, one state parliament – Mato Grosso do Sul – still failed to elect any women.

### Female and male state and Federal District deputies (%)



// Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

The number of women who are state governors is particularly representative of low female participation. The first woman governor in Brazilian history was Roseana Sarney, elected governor of Maranhão in 1994. Since then, women have governed states for 11 terms (including re-elections), with a total of eight governors. Of those 11 terms, seven were in the Northeast, two in the North, one in the Southeast and one in the South.



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

In addition to these women who were elected governors, five others were also elected vice-governors and eventually took office permanently. Therefore, 13 women have been state governors in Brazilian history.

### Vice-governor who took office permanently



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

The most recent data show that, since 2014, we have returned to the level of the 1990s in terms of women governors, with only one being elected in a total of 27 states.

### State governors (2018-2022)




Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

### Representation at Municipal Level

At municipal level, women are generally marginalized in terms of elected offices, and the situation is quite similar at state and federal levels. Considering that municipal offices tend to be the gateway to politics, a longstanding 15% of female city councillors shows that the obstacle is systemic and that women are barred already in the first stages of their political careers.


In the 2016 municipal elections, when women were 13.5% of elected councillors, data provided by the Superior Electoral Court show that one fifth of the country's City Councils (1,286 out of 5,568) had only men elected. This means that 23.1% of Brazil's City Councils do not include any women.

### Female and male mayors (%)



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

### Female and male city councillors (%)



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

The 2016 Election also saw a 0.2 percentage point reduction in the number of women elected as mayors, when 638 were elected to govern 11.5% of the 5,531 Brazilian municipalities. However, most of these municipalities are not among the largest cities, and they account for only 7% of the country’s population. In addition, only 3% of these women elected as mayors in 2016 declared themselves black.<sup>111</sup>

## REPRESENTATION OF BLACK AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

Several analyses point to virtually the same perception: Brazilian politics is mostly white.<sup>112</sup> According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), “black” and “mixed-race” people make up 56.1% of the Brazilian population but accounted for only 46.5% (10.8% and 35.7%, respectively) of around 29,000 candidates to the eight offices that were up for election in 2018 — president, governors, two senators per state, federal deputies and state deputies.<sup>113</sup> When that election was over, black (plus mixed-race) or indigenous people were only 27.6% of candidates elected for the Federal Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the parliament of the Federal District or the State Parliaments, and 25.9% of elected governors.

Such scenario of unequal political representation is even stronger when we look at black women. They are 27% of the Brazilian population but hold only 2.36% of seats in Congress.<sup>114</sup>

**INEQUALITIES MAY IMPACT BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY IN SEVERAL WAYS. THAT'S CLEAR WHEN WE TALK ABOUT POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: BLACK WOMEN ARE THE LARGEST DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP IN BRAZIL AND THE SMALLEST GROUP IN CONGRESS**

Anielle Franco, executive director of the Marielle Franco Institute






### Representation at Federal Level

In 2018, 126 self-declared black or indigenous people were elected to the Chamber of Deputies<sup>115</sup> – 24.56% of the seats. That means 23 more than in the previous election – an increase of 4.87 percentage points in representation of black or indigenous people but still less than half of what would mirror Brazil’s population.

In 2018, 14 women – including black (13) and indigenous (1) ones – were elected federal deputies, accounting for 2.72% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>116</sup> They include Joênia Wapichana, the first indigenous woman to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies in Brazilian history.<sup>117</sup>


### Female and male federal deputies (%)



# Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

In the Federal Senate, 20 self-declared black or mixed-race senators were elected in 2018 – 37% of the representatives elected in that year.<sup>118</sup> Of those 20 senators, one was a black woman (Eliziane Gama, elected senator for the state of Maranhão), accounting for 1.85% of the seats that were up for election – 18.5 percentage points over the number of black deputies elected in 2014. However, black or mixed-race male and female senators make up less than a third of the Chamber (25 seats or 30.8%). Gama is the only black woman holding a seat in the Federal Senate – 1.23% or one tenth of the women who hold a seat in the Chamber today.

### Female and male senators (%)




<sup>118</sup> Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

### Representation at State and Municipal Levels


In 2018, 305 black or indigenous candidates were elected to state or Federal District parliaments, accounting for 28.8% of the seats, including 51 black women (4.81%). That is 2.2 percentage points higher than in 2014 (280 or 26.63% of state and Federal District parliaments) but accounts for less than a third of total seats in those parliaments. In 2014, 36 black women were elected as state or district deputies (3.39%).

Seven black governors were elected in 2018 – they were six in 2014, including one woman: Fátima Bezerra, in Rio Grande do Norte (RN). That is 25.93% of the country’s governors – a 3.7-percentage point difference over 2014.

Female and male state and federal District deputies (%)



Female and male state governors (%)




Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

In 2016, the first year with data available on skin colours/races of candidates running in municipal elections so far, 1,604 self-declared black or indigenous mayors were elected, accounting for 29.01% of mayors, of whom six were indigenous people (0.1%) elected especially in Brazil’s North and Northeast regions, in the towns of Marechal Thaumaturgo (Acre), São Gabriel da Cachoeira (Amazonas), Jacundá (Para), Marcação (Paraíba), Tacuratu (Pernambuco) and Lajeado (Pernambuco).<sup>119</sup> In that year, 184 black women (3.29% of mayors)<sup>120</sup> and one indigenous woman (0.018%) were elected.<sup>121</sup>

A total of 24,504 black (24,387) and indigenous (117)<sup>122</sup> city councillors were elected in 2016, or 42.37% of those offices. This is the highest percentage of representation ever, but still 15 percentage points below black and indigenous peoples’ share of Brazilian society. In 2016, 2,871 black women and 28 indigenous women had been elected – accounting for 4.96% and 0.048% of elected city councillors, respectively.<sup>123</sup> Some black women were highly voted for city councils of large cities,<sup>124</sup> such as Áurea Carolina and Talíria Petrone, the best voted councillors in Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) and Niterói (Rio de Janeiro), respectively, and Marielle Franco, who had the fifth largest number of votes in Rio de Janeiro<sup>125</sup> and whose murder in March 2018 represented an attack on human rights and democracy,<sup>126</sup> a symbol of the unacceptable political violence against black women in Brazil.<sup>127</sup>

Mayors and city councillors - 2016 (%)



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

## Obstacles to Access Black and Indigenous Candidacies

The black movement strengthened their action after the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988 in terms of number of organizations, plurality of strategies or specialization of agendas,<sup>128</sup> but they still struggle to change political under-representation of black and mixed-race people.

This scenario has been associated with selective mechanisms that favour certain over-represented social segments— in this case, white men — over others, imposing a top-down race and gender hierarchy.<sup>129</sup> These mechanisms would work to restrict the number of black and indigenous candidates in mainstream political parties, thus reducing their chances of being elected.<sup>130</sup>

More structured parties provide more access to financial and material resources to their candidates — such as, for example, TV time — that are essential for competitiveness,<sup>131</sup> given that more competitive candidacies tend to be more expensive.<sup>132</sup> Fundraising and intra-party mobilization that are needed to ensure the material resources necessary for successful candidacies are strongly associated with social class background, since people at the top of the social pyramid are also at the highest levels of political hierarchies,<sup>133</sup> which also impacts party recruitment.

The result of this convergence of factors is a systemic party preference for white candidates who – being undoubtedly more numerous among the middle and upper social and political classes – have greater capacity for attracting financial resources and having sociability networks that may expand the scope of their candidacies.<sup>134</sup>

## Elements that are obstacles to being a black or indigenous candidate

### ACCESS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS

- Successful candidacies tend to be more expensive. Black and indigenous people have less access to large funds.
- Until the 2015 ban on corporate donations, private companies tended to allocate funds to candidates with higher chances of winning, which probably harms candidates from subordinate groups.

### SOCIAL CLASS BACKGROUND

- Association between people from higher social classes and the top of political hierarchies.
- More prestigious professions (such as lawyers, doctors and engineers) are associated with the image of good administrators, favouring such candidates.
- Black and indigenous people are under-represented in higher-income social strata and among those with professions associated with the political hierarchy.

### PARTY RECRUITMENT

- More structured— and electorally more competitive — political parties favour candidates with greater capacity to attract votes.
- Black or indigenous candidates tend to lack the traditional, consolidated funding networks and suffer the additional effect of prejudice, as their current political under-representation is seen as a sign of low electoral chances in the future – a view that reproduces such inequality.


// Source: Gaxie (2012); Campos & Machado (2017).



Another aspect of the Brazilian electoral-party system that limits the political rise of the black population is the possibility of launching a high number of candidates – a manoeuvre used to artificially inflate the electoral quotient. In a proportional, open-list system, the distribution of seats in parliaments is based on the total amount of votes received by a party coalition, which will therefore tend to have as many candidates as possible. While it encourages a higher number of candidates, it also drives parties to invest only and/or preferably in more traditional and promising names.<sup>135</sup> Consequently, the percentage of black and mixed-race candidates in elections for city councils, for example, is usually close to that of the national population but that does not apply to competitive candidates, who are mostly white. Again, the main exclusion filter seems to apply before the elections.

As a reaction to that, a group of parliamentarians and organizations from black people and black women<sup>136</sup> movements have been mobilized to ensure that money from the party fund and TV and radio time are reserved for black candidates, through consultation with the Superior Electoral Court (see table below) and a bill that sets quotas for male and female black candidates.<sup>137</sup> The campaign was based on a study<sup>138</sup> that showed the imbalance between the number of candidates and the resources received by parties, pointing out that, in the 2018 elections for the Chamber of Deputies, white women were 18.1% of the candidates and received 16.2% of party funds; white men were 43.1% of the candidates and received 61.4% of funds; black women were 12.9% of the candidates and received 5.7% of those funds; and black men were 26% of the candidates and received only 16.67%.<sup>139</sup>

### Candidates running for federal deputies in 2018: funds versus number of candidates (%)



// Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

## **THE SUPERIOR ELECTORAL COURT (TSE) DECIDES THAT THE DIVISION OF THE ELECTORAL FUND AND TV TIME SHOULD BE PROPORTIONAL TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BLACK CANDIDATES**

On August 25, 2020, the Plenary Session of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) decided that resources from the Special Fund for Campaign Financing (FEFC) and the time for free electoral advertising on TV and radio should be distributed proportionally to the total number of black candidates that parties present to the election.<sup>140</sup>

The Court decided on two questions posed by Federal Deputy Benedita da Silva and black movement organizations (Educafro, Mulheres Negras Decidem, and Instituto Marielle Franco)<sup>141</sup>:

1. The possibility of reserving 50% of the seats and 50% of the Electoral Fund share – incentives provided for in electoral quota legislation since the mid-1990s – specifically for black female candidates.
2. The possibility of an electoral quota for black candidates, corresponding to 30% of the FEFC money and free electoral advertising time on radio and TV.

The TSE Plenary Session provided a partial answer to the first question, proposing that funds and free radio/TV time be proportional to the number of black candidates registered, regardless of whether they are men or women. As for the second question, the Court denied the request, stating that it must be made through Congress.

The Court also decided that the proposed distribution of funds and radio/TV time would not apply to the 2020 Elections, since any law that changes electoral procedures only applies to elections held after a year of its coming into force. This view was reformed on September 3, 2020, after Federal Supreme Court (STF) Justice Ricardo Lewandowski granted an injunction so that proportional distribution of funds already applied to the 2020 municipal elections. According to Justice Lewandowski,<sup>142</sup> parties should strictly follow the Constitution when it comes to allocation of public funds, which would be possible and applicable since party conventions and electoral campaigns had not started yet. This view would be confirmed by the Plenary Session of the STF on October 2, 2020.<sup>143</sup>

## 2020 ELECTIONS: INCREMENTAL PROGRESS IN REPRESENTATION BUT A LONG WAY TO GO

The 2020 municipal elections held on November 15 (first round) and November 29 (second round, in cities with more than 200,000 people) happened in an exceptionally challenging context as a result of the novel coronavirus pandemic.<sup>144</sup> A Constitutional Amendment adjusted the election schedule<sup>145</sup> to ensure the necessary social distance – still the best way to prevent the spread of the pandemic before an effective vaccine was developed – delaying the start of campaigns and shortening the interval between rounds from three to two weeks.

In this scenario, based on preliminary information and studies, we will discuss three dynamics of the 2020 Elections: a) unprecedented majority of black candidates and the largest number of women candidates in history; b) increase in the number of so-called collective candidacies; and c) elected candidates: incremental progress but a long way to go.

### Unprecedented Majority of Black Candidates and the Largest Number of Women Candidates in History

The debate on under-representation of women, black and indigenous people in Brazilian institutional politics is the order of the day, with mobilization dynamics underway and policy changes taking place all the time. The 2020 municipal elections were an important laboratory on the changes arising from the TSE's recent decision on the distribution of funds and TV/radio time.

As the first election after the Court's decision on the proportional distribution of funds and TV/radio time among black candidates, the 2020 municipal election campaign was marked by two novelties: it was the first election in which the number of black candidates surpassed those of whites and it had the largest number of female candidates in history.<sup>146</sup> According to the TSE, of the more


**WITHOUT OUR PRESENCE, WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE BLACK POPULATION, WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF WOMEN, OF THE LGBTQIA+, THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY. THERE IS A SIMULATION OF DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACY ONLY EXISTS WHEN ALL SOCIAL GROUPS ARE REPRESENTED IN SOCIETY'S SPACES. THUS, THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLACK, INDIGENOUS, FEMALE, LGBTQIA+ BODY GUARANTEES THAT WE CAN ACTUALLY SAY DEMOCRACY, WE CAN SPEAK OF DEMOCRACY**

Erika Hilton, São Paulo city councillor

than 545,000 candidates registered, black people were 49.87% (272,043) compared to 47.77% who were white candidates (260,574). In 2016, blacks were 47.76% and


whites were 51.45%. In 2020, women were 33.1% of the candidates (180,799), compared to 31.9% in 2016.<sup>147</sup>

### 2020 Municipal elections – candidates (%)



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

### 2020 Municipal elections – candidates (%)



Source: Elaborated by Oxfam Brasil.

While the figures are positive, they deserve special attention because, given the dynamics of under-representation of women and black and indigenous people, they involve high discrepancy between the number of candidates and those actually elected. The need for caution is reinforced by preliminary surveys that show that parties still invest more in white male candidates. They received 62.9% of funds in the first 25 days of the campaign, even though they were 47.9% of candidates,<sup>148</sup> and they also made up the vast majority of mayoral candidates in the 95 largest Brazilian cities.<sup>149</sup>

In São Paulo, Brazil's largest city, an analysis conducted shortly before the first election round indicated that 74% of public campaign money went to white candidates; in 11 of Brazil's largest cities, less than 10% of public funds were allocated to black people.<sup>150</sup>

Inequality remains in electoral races, with black people accounting for 57% of candidates "without assets," of which 22.4% are black women.<sup>151</sup> About a third of all black female candidates in the 2020 municipal elections depended on emergency aid to survive during the pandemic.<sup>152</sup> Less than 1% of the candidates in the 2020 elections concentrated 80% of public campaign funds.<sup>153</sup>



## Collective Candidacies: Diversity and Multiplicity

Another dynamic that gained momentum in the 2020 municipal elections was the increase in the number of collective candidacies. Under varied formats but often headed by female candidates and including black women, collective candidacies emerge as a way to increase political participation based on an identity debate<sup>154</sup> intersecting gender and race, thus leveraging agendas and narratives from the margins of political debate such as the discussion of public policies from the perspective of the outskirts of large cities.

**OUR ARRIVAL IN THIS SPACE REPRESENTS A TRANSFORMATIONAL PROCESS, AND THIS TRANSFORMATION STRENGTHENS DEMOCRACY. MY ARRIVAL IN SÃO PAULO'S CITY COUNCIL AS THE BEST-VOTED WOMAN IN THE COUNTRY SHOWS OUR EXISTENCE, SHOWS OUR ORGANIZATION, SHOWS OUR DESIRE, OUR WILL, OUR ABILITY TO PLAY THE POLITICAL GAME, AND IT STRENGTHENS DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND SEVERAL DISTINCT WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT SOCIETY AND POLITICS**

Erika Hilton, São Paulo City Councillor

Collective candidacies made their debut in Brazilian party politics in 2016, with the election of five people to the city council of Alto Paraíso (GO).<sup>155</sup> In such candidacies, only one name is formally listed as the candidate while the others work as legislative aids. The practice inspired other experiences in the following election in 2018, when collective candidacies – Gabinetona (Minas Gerais),<sup>156</sup> Bancada Ativista (São Paulo)<sup>157</sup> and Juntas (Pernambuco)<sup>158</sup> – were elected for at least three state parliaments converging on feminist, anti-racist, pro-indigenous and LGBTQIA+ citizenship agendas, and focused on urban outskirts, well-being, youth and other topics that are traditionally marginalized on the public agenda.

In 2020, there were at least 331 collective candidacies in municipal elections.<sup>159</sup> Only the city of São Paulo had 34 of those for the City Council,<sup>160</sup> while Natal (Rio Grande do Norte) saw a collective candidacy for mayor – the first one for an executive office in Brazil.<sup>161</sup>

Preliminary surveys indicate that at least 17 collective candidacies were elected across the country<sup>162</sup> – two for São Paulo's City Council, including that with the seventh largest number of votes – Bancada Feminista,<sup>163</sup> represented on the ballot by educator Silvia Ferraro – and another one built by the black movement – Quilombo Periférico,<sup>164</sup> represented by cultural organizer Elaine Mineiro. Collective candidacies were also elected to the city councils of Florianópolis (Santa Catarina),<sup>165</sup> Fortaleza (Ceará)<sup>166</sup> e Salvador (Bahia).<sup>167</sup>

## Elected candidates: incremental progress but a long way to go

The results that came out of voting machines in the 2020 municipal elections showed two dynamics: a) a slight increase in the number of women and black people elected mayors and city councillors; and b) important and representative victories for women, transgender and black candidates.

**RACIAL JUSTICE MUST BE ON THE AGENDA TO COMBAT INEQUALITIES; AND NO, I DON'T THINK WE CAN HAVE REAL DEMOCRACY WHILE YOUNG BLACK PEOPLE ARE KILLED IN FAVELAS OR BLACK WOMEN ARE THE MAIN VICTIMS OF OBSTETRIC VIOLENCE. WE CAN'T HAVE DEMOCRACY UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF BLACK CHILDREN FROM THE FAVELAS OR UNTIL WE KNOW WHO ORDERED THE MURDER OF A BLACK COUNCILLOR, MY SISTER MARIELLE**

Anielle Franco, executive director of the Marielle Franco Institute

In the 23<sup>rd</sup> year of the Law on Electoral Quotas for Women, and a few months after the Electoral Court's important decision establishing proportional distribution of financial resources and TV/radio time for black candidates, the 2020 municipal election saw, once again, a majority of white males elected as mayors and city councillors across the country.<sup>168</sup> There was a shy increase in the number of women and black people elected in 2020.

In Brazil's 94 largest cities, with populations over 200,000, only 17 black people were elected (two black and 15 mixed-race candidates), representing 20% of those elected; the percentage is virtually the same as in 2016, when 18 black mayors were elected.<sup>169</sup>

Eight women were elected mayors among the 94 largest municipalities; in 2016, they had been three. In state capitals, only one mayor (Cinthia Ribeiro, in Palmas, Tocantins) was elected, repeating 2012 and 2016, when Teresa Surita was the only woman to be elected mayor of a state capital in Brazil, in Boa Vista (Roraima).

Of the 57 cities that had runoffs, 19 had women candidates; of these, only seven won their races.<sup>170</sup>

Women were 16% of city councillors elected in Brazil in 2020;<sup>171</sup> in 2016, they had been 13.5%. Black women were 6.3% of city councillors elected in 2020, more than the 5% of 2016. In 2020, 12.1% of elected mayors were women,<sup>172</sup> compared to 11.57% in 2016. Under-representation is still there, given that women are 51.8% of the population.

In the overall balance of the 2020 municipal elections, we saw an increase in representation of black people in terms of city councillors and mayors. Of the more than 5,400 mayors elected, 32% declared themselves black or mixed-race; in 2016, they had been 29%;<sup>173</sup> 44.7% of elected councillors declared themselves black or mixed-race, compared to 42.1% in 2016.<sup>174</sup> The increase in black councillors, however, falls short of the 56% share of this group in Brazil's population.



In state capitals, 44% of elected city councillors were black and 18% of them were black women.<sup>175</sup> Palmas (95%), Cuiabá (76%), São Luiz (74%), Porto Velho (70%) and Salvador (70%) have the highest presence of black councillors, both men and women. Porto Alegre (RS) (11%), Curitiba (11%), São Paulo (18%), Recife (28%) and Rio de Janeiro (31%) elected the lowest number of black councillors. Of the 26 capitals where elections were held until the end of December,<sup>176</sup> only one did not elect any black person to its city council: Florianópolis.<sup>177</sup>

Some important victories deserve to be highlighted. In São Paulo, Erika Hilton received the highest number of votes among female candidates for city councillor in the country (50,508)<sup>178</sup> and was the tenth most-voted candidate in 2020. Elected co-state deputy in the collective candidacy Bancada Ativista in 2018, Hilton is the first black trans woman to hold a seat in São Paulo's City Council,<sup>179</sup> being elected chairperson of its Human Rights Commission.<sup>180</sup>

Black women were the vote champions in the city councils of Porto Alegre<sup>181</sup> Recife<sup>182</sup>, Rio Branco<sup>183</sup> e Araraquara.<sup>184</sup> In Belo Horizonte<sup>185</sup> and Aracajú,<sup>186</sup> trans women councillors debuted in city councils with the highest votes; 30 trans people were elected to city councils throughout Brazil<sup>187</sup> — compared to only three in 2016 — in cities such as Batatais, Niterói, Lapa, Patrocínio Paulista, Uberlândia, São Borja and São Paulo (3), among others.

Curitiba,<sup>188</sup> Vitória<sup>189</sup> and Campina Grande,<sup>190</sup> elected their first black city councillors ever, with large votes. At least 220 indigenous and 57 quilombola (slave-descendant communities) people were elected throughout the country in 2020 — the highest number in history,<sup>191</sup> with an increase of 26% and 45% of indigenous and quilombola elected councillors, respectively.



## ELECTORAL REFORM 2021: RISK OF SETBACKS

Since the beginning of the second half of 2021, Congress has been debating a set of proposals to modify electoral rules. If passed, it will be one of the largest changes in the country's political system in recent decades. The changes occur on two fronts, both in the Chamber of Deputies:

- **Special Committee<sup>192</sup> on Proposed Constitutional Amendment 125/2011:** After Proposed Constitutional Amendment (PEC) 125 of 2011, which prohibits<sup>193</sup> holding elections close to national holidays, a special committee<sup>194</sup> was created to address several electoral reform topics, including term length;<sup>195</sup> mandatory debates;<sup>196</sup> number of members of Congress; race<sup>197</sup> and gender<sup>198</sup> quotas; campaign financing;<sup>199</sup> individual and collective candidacies;<sup>200</sup> and the name of the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>201</sup> The changes with stronger potential for impact include the so-called "district vote."<sup>202</sup>
- **Working Group on Electoral Legislation Reform:** Created in February 2021 by an act of the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, this Working Group aimed to consolidate so-called infra-constitutional electoral legislation by proposing an Electoral Code. Delivered to the Chairman at the end of June 2021, the new Electoral Code draft has more than 900 articles with provisions that reduce transparency and control over campaign expenses,<sup>203</sup> restrict disclosure of polls<sup>204</sup> and establish that new electoral legislation is only applicable to elections held one year after its approval.<sup>205</sup>

Conducting a macro-electoral reform during a pandemic raises concerns,<sup>206</sup> given that it was carried out in the context of exceptionally abbreviated parliamentary pro-

cedures, with lower transparency and less social participation as a result of measures against Covid-19. In fact, the search for speedy approval – considering the October 2021 deadline for electoral changes to be valid for the 2022 election – led to mischaracterization of PEC 125/2011, a proposition that was used because its constitutionality had already been verified by the Chamber's Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship.<sup>207</sup> In addition to questions about the reform process, at least two changes in electoral rules have potential negative impacts on increasing the representation of politically minorities: a) the proposal to adopt the "district" vote; and b) changes in women's participation quotas.

**DISTRICT-BASED ELECTIONS FAVOR INDIVIDUAL COMPETITION, REINFORCES A LOGIC OF PERSONALISTIC CANDIDACIES WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND MAJOR MEDIA EXPOSURE, WEAKENS THE PROGRAMMATIC AGENDA OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND UNDERMINES THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVELY BUILT GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, ENCOURAGING STANCES BASED ON "EVERY MAN FOR HIMSELF" IN POLITICS**

Front for the Advancement of Women's Political Rights (FADPM)

## District-Based Elections

The proposal to establish district-based voting in legislative elections changes the open-list proportional model that has been in force in Brazil since the 1940s and replaces it with the majority voting model. This model tends to benefit well-known names – especially incumbents – and make political renewal difficult.

Surveys simulating the result of the last election show that, if district-based voting had already been adopted, white, middle-aged, male federal deputies with more economic means and consolidated political histories would have been favoured in the election for the Chamber.<sup>208</sup> In this scenario, the number of women and black people elected in 2018 would fall from 77 to 73 (– 5.19%) and from 125 to 117 (–6.4%), respectively.<sup>209</sup> Joênia Wapichana, the first indigenous woman elected federal deputy would not have been elected.<sup>210</sup> Thus, by favouring incumbents, district-based elections mean less opportunities for politically minorities such as women, black people and indigenous people.<sup>211</sup>

## Reserved Seats for Women and the End of Gender Quotas

Another point present in the macro-electoral reform debate is the change in the policy to encourage more political-electoral participation by women.<sup>212</sup> The proposals under discussion would create a reserve of 15% of legislative seats for women, while ending the mandatory minimum quota of 30% of female candidates by cancelling sanctions to parties that do not reach that percentage. Studies point out that these measures will mean a setback in the agenda of women's representation in politics.<sup>213</sup>

Regarding reservation of seats, the proposed change will not mean a significant change in practice.<sup>214</sup> According to the *More Women in Politics Forum*<sup>215</sup> based on the 2018 election data, with the exception of the Northeast, all Brazilian regions already have more than 15% of women elected to the Chamber of Deputies;<sup>216</sup> today there are 77 women among 513 federal deputies – exactly 15% of the seats. Fourteen State Parliaments surpassed the average of 15% of seats held by women;<sup>217</sup> these states concentrate 61% of the country's population. In city Councils, data on the 2020 elections indicate that women hold 16% of the seats, and even more (17%) in municipalities with up to 15,000 inhabitants, which account for 58.4% of all Brazilian municipalities.<sup>218</sup>

As for the end of quotas, if the 30% quota for women candidates is abolished, there will be no guarantee of a sufficient number of women candidates to fill the 15% of reserved seats,<sup>219</sup> and that figure may become a ceiling rather than a floor on women's political participation.<sup>220</sup> Therefore, the mandatory minimum percentage of women candidates – added of parties' obligation to provide campaign funds to candidates according to STF ruling on Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) 5617 – would become a mere recommendation with no major legal consequences, given that it also abolishes sanctions to parties for non-compliance.<sup>221</sup>





The Brazilian National Congress and state legislative assemblies are primarily composed of white men.

Photo: Wilson Dias/Agência Brasil

**PART 4:**  
**PROPOSAL**  
**TO IMPROVE**  
**BRAZILIAN**  
**DEMOCRACY**

Inequality is an unavoidable topic on Brazil's current public agenda. The economic crisis that began in 2015 reversed the trend to reducing social inequality in Brazil – something that, in itself, would be a major challenge to Brazilian society. In 2020, Brazil reached the mark of 9% of its population facing hunger – almost twice the 5% threshold adopted by the UN Hunger Map; even so, the national food protection system was among the participatory councils extinguished by the Bolsonaro government in the first half of 2019.

Amidst this extremely fragile scenario, the Covid-19 pandemic hit Brazil and the world in 2020. As the hardest global health crisis in recent decades, Covid-19 found fertile ground to spread quickly in the country, which has the world's second highest number of infections and deaths, with more than half a million lives lost to the disease, even though it has only the sixth largest population on the planet.<sup>222</sup> It spread mainly on the outskirts of large cities and on smaller towns, precisely where people have less access to health care, basic sanitation and decent housing. Higher mortality rates among the black population, as pointed out in some preliminary studies,<sup>223</sup> underscore the uneven effect of a pandemic that still has no cure or treatment.

This scenario has been aggravated by the federal government's catastrophic management, which combines denying science, instrumentalizing the pandemic against political opponents, lack of coordination with states and municipalities, and administrative instability, which led to three changes of health ministers at the most serious moment of the Covid-19 crisis in Brazil. Against this background, the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the pandemic, established by the Federal Senate in late April 2021, raised evidence of parallel – and denial-oriented<sup>224</sup> – management of the health crisis and possible misuse of public funds to purchase vaccines against Covid-19.<sup>225</sup>

The adoption of inclusive and effective public policies in the fight against inequalities, capable of responding adequately to a context of converging – economic and health – crises, also involves mitigating inequality in political representation. That would enable demographic majorities in society and minority groups in spaces of power – such as women and black people – to increase their presence in Executive and Legislative offices.

This report addressed the role of democracy in reducing inequalities, including in terms of political representation. On this subject, and with no intention to exhaust the subject, Oxfam Brasil presents the following work agenda.

## Democracy and inequalities

### DEMOCRATIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

- Opening spaces for more women and black people in positions of power and decision-making within party structures
- Establishing targets for women and black people to hold positions in party governing bodies, under penalty of fine on the amount of public funds
- Creating training programs for young leaders

### MATERIAL EQUITY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING

- Drafting legislation that ensures proportional allocation of funds and radio/TV time for women, black and indigenous candidates
- Creating an institutional mechanism to verify compliance with the proportional distribution of funds and radio/TV time to women, black and indigenous candidates

### STRICTER LIMITS ON CAMPAIGN DONATIONS

- Setting limits on individual campaign donations, currently 10% of one's annual gross income

### STRENGTHENING PARTICIPATORY COUNCILS

- Repealing the measure that abolished participatory councils
- Re-establishing participatory councils that make up the national food security system, especially the National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (CONSEA)

### EXTENDING THE STREET CAMPAIGN PERIOD

- Extending the period for street campaign from 45 to 90 days

### PROTECTION MEASURES AGAINST POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN

- Strengthening protective policies aimed at politicians who are victims of political violence, especially black women



**THE BLACK LETTER:  
THE POLITICS WE  
WANT**

Faced with a scenario of under-representation of black women in institutional political spaces, despite their frontline role in confronting inequalities in Brazil, 40 black women activists, both trans and cis, who ran in the 2020 elections, voiced their demand for greater political participation in the manifesto **Black Letter – The Politics We Want**,<sup>226</sup> launched in July 2021. The document, created orally and then transformed into text, originated in the meeting *Jornada das Pretas 2021*,<sup>227</sup> reaffirming the commitment of those activists to fighting inequalities and racist violence, criticizing endemic machismo and structural racism in force in Brazilian political parties.

The document denounces the continuation of a political project that favours white men in the distribution of party funds, who are offered ten times more than black women.<sup>228</sup> In the context of the pandemic, work overload in the household, domestic violence, and higher unemployment rates resulting from high levels of informal labour are catalysts for the absence of women in from public spaces in general and from politics in particular.<sup>229</sup>

“Politics is made every day, when we breathe, resist and try to fight for more rights, and it is built in our territory. We are women who have made and are making a difference. Women such as Anielle Franco, Aqualtunem Antônia Barbosa, Ângela Davis, Antonieta de Barros, Ariete, Benny Briolly, Dandara, Eliana Gonzaga, Conceição Evaristo, Mãe Estela, Mãe Menininha, Ranavalona, Renata Souza and Vilma Reis”, the Letter concludes.<sup>230</sup>

**WE ARE MAKING POLITICS BLACK. THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY WITH RACISM AND BRAZILIAN POLITICS WILL NOT LOOK LIKE ITS PEOPLE IF ITS FACE IS NOT THAT OF BLACK WOMEN. WE ARE BREAKING WITH STRUCTURES, AND WE ARE HERE TO STAY. WE ARE WOMEN WHO ARE TIRED OF BEING SILENCED. BUT NOW WE ARE READY TO OCCUPY THIS DECISION-MAKING SPACE THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN DENIED TO US**

Black Letter Manifesto: The Politics We Want

## **THE BLACK LETTER – THE POLITICS WE WANT**

This is a spoken letter that has been transformed into text. It was prepared by 40 black trans and cis women activists who ran in the 2020 elections and participated in *Jornada das Pretas* 2021, on April 30, and May 4 and 8, 2021, to exchange knowledge and systematize black women's experiences of political participation in elections, in addition to building a political agenda for black women to enhance their candidacies for the 2022 elections. *Jornada das Pretas* was promoted by Oxfam Brasil, with Alziras Institute and Marielle Franco Institute under a project co-financed by The Barcelona Municipal Government and the European Union.

### **Who are the women from *Jornada das Pretas*?**

We are the voice of resistance that echoes from the wombs of great mothers. We want justice for our people's shed blood. We are the voice of conscience and we will occupy Congress to promote Xangô's justice.

We are women who do not accept racial inequality and oppression. We have the determination and courage to continue the struggle that our black people have always been fighting. Sometimes we get down, because the struggle is hard, despite our strength. *Jornada das Pretas* made us rise from the ashes of the struggles experienced in 2020. That meeting of black women gave us strength to re-emerge, more confident and wiser, with the certainty that we are not alone. We have each other.

We are women who are tired of being silenced. But now we are ready to occupy the decision-making space that we have always been denied.

### **Challenges to black women's political participation**

Brazilian society was structured as a system of oppression. Thus, the integrity, visibility, rights and struggles of trans and cis black women become guidelines for survival. Therefore, political participation by that group – that is at the base of the Brazilian social pyramid – is urgent, essential and necessary.

Machismo and institutional racism prevail in Brazilian political parties. This is clear when a political project is maintained that favours white man in party fund distribution. As a result, black women receive ten times less funding than white men.

Black women's first challenge in politics is to have their potential recognised as representatives of their rights and their life experiences. This recognition has to come because black women struggle and know history. Black women have the will to win in several spheres, but still face unacceptance that they can represent different groups in other instances.

Another challenge is survival. At a time when the economic crisis is worsening due to the Covid-19 pandemic, we know that black women are hit hardest by the overload of household work, domestic violence, unemployment and precarious work. All this causes them to be absent from public spaces and, in particular, from politics.

For black trans women in politics, one of the challenges is to survive the LGBTQIA+phobia that naturalized institutional violence and racism against them. We want political parties not to use us as extras and guarantee us space on radio and TV during the electoral process, incorporating the agendas of black feminism, the LGBTQIA+ population and the anti-racist struggle into party structures and programs.

Let us not forget that political violence has gender and colour.

#### **What are we doing to change this context?**

We are organizing ourselves in networks, fighting for parties, for spaces of power in elections, placing ourselves as subjects to change our history and the direction taken by our country.

We are making politics black. There is no democracy with racism and Brazilian politics will not look like its people if its face is not that of black women. We are breaking with structures, and we are here to stay.

#### **What do we want for trans and cis black women in politics?**

We hope that trans and cis black women are included in power and decision-making spaces in politics without suffering violence such as racism, machismo and LGBTQI+phobia, and that political parties give us voice and power. That our agendas stop being hijacked and that parties stop using us to be able to say that there is representation when in fact there is not.

We, black trans and cis women, demand to be recognized, welcomed, respected and valued in this democracy. May we never be silenced again. May our lifelong activism not be provisional in the mouths of anti-democrats. May we feel truly included in Brazil and in politics.

We expect equality in politics and in political parties. We want public policies for this. May the party fund be really well distributed.

We want candidacies with the support and funding that we are entitled to, reducing political inequality so that we can compete equally for our offices and seats.

We want organization, resistance and struggle. It is the movement we bring from our history, and our ancestry that will break the sexist, racist, LGBTQIA+phobic structure that keeps society based on oppression. As Angela Davis said: "When black women move, the entire structure of society moves with them".

#### **Who are the women who inspire us to participate in politics?**

The women who inspire us to participate in politics are the older ones, they are our mothers and grandmothers, for all they did to get us where we are. They are also the younger ones, because we fight for them, so that they will inherit a fairer and better world to live in.

Politics is made every day, when we breathe, resist and try to fight for more rights, and it is built in our territory.

Marielle Franco showed us that it is necessary to have courage to grow the hope of the future in our country, even occupying institutional spaces of politics.

We are women who have made and are making a difference. Women such as Anielle Franco, Aquatunem Antônia Barbosa, Ângela Davis, Antonieta de Barros, Ariete, Benny Briolly, Dandara, Eliana Gonzaga, Conceição Evaristo, Mãe Estela, Mãe Menininha, Ranavalona, Renata Souza and Vilma Reis.

We are Áurea Carolina, Benedita da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, Erica Malunguinho, Leci Brandão, Luiza Erundina, Manuela D'Ávila, Mônica Seixas, Olívia Santana, Sâmia Bonfim, Talíria Petrone, and so many others who inspire us.

## REFERENCES

- 1 OXFAM BRASIL. 2018. **País Estagnado**. Available at <https://bit.ly/3bmcPPw>. Acessado em 29 de julho de 2021.
- 2 REDE BRASIL ATUAL. 2019. **Dieese: fim do ganho real para salário-mínimo é abandono da “visão de civilização”**. December 26, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Vd16el>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 3 UNDP. 2020. **Human Development Report 2020 — The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene**. Available at <https://bit.ly/3pR6lZp>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 4 UOL. 2019. **IBGE: 10% mais ricos têm rendimento 13 vezes maior do que os 40% mais pobres**. November 6, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Gk4LDv>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 5 THE ECONOMIST. 2020. **Brazil faces hard spending choices in 2021**. December 19, 2020. Available at <https://econ.st/3pQlrnA>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 6 Rede Brasileira de Pesquisa em Soberania e Segurança Alimentar (Rede PENSSAN). 2021. **Insegurança alimentar e Covid-19 no Brasil**. Available at <https://bit.ly/39Jok3V>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 7 AGÊNCIA IBGE. 2020. **PNAD Contínua: taxa de desocupação é de 12,9% e taxa de subutilização é de 27,5% no trimestre encerrado em maio de 2020**. June 30, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3ohFFWX>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 8 The Parts will feature excerpts from interviews given to Oxfam Brasil by the following experts: 1) **Oscar Vilhena Vieira**, professor at Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) Law School, SP, Master in Law from Columbia University (USA) and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of São Paulo (USP); 2) **Anielle Franco**, educator, journalist, writer, feminist and executive director of Marielle Franco Institute; and 3) **Erika Hilton**, black, trans woman activist, black and LGBT rights activist, and Brazilian politician. In 2018, she was elected state co-deputy in São Paulo. In 2020, she was elected for the São Paulo City Council as the female candidate with the highest number of votes for parliament in Brazil in that election. Today, she chairs São Paulo City Council’s Human Rights Commission.
- 9 DAUFEMBACK, Valdirene. 2018. **E se os presos votassem?** In: *Justificando*, October 9, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3jX1mcA>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 10 According to Articles 198 (Health), 204 (Social Assistance) and 206 (Education) of the Federal Constitution.
- 11 SOUZA, Pedro Herculano Guimarães Ferreira de. 2018. **Uma história de desigualdade: a concentração de renda entre os ricos, 1926-2013**. Hucitec Editora, São Paulo.
- 12 Ibid., p. 360.
- 13 Ibid., p. 230; BBC BRASIL. 2020. **Democracia não garante queda da desigualdade, mas disparidade aumenta em ditaduras, diz vencedor do Prêmio Jabuti**. January 12, 2020. Available at <https://bbc.in/3lsBYPL>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 14 SOUZA. 2018, p. 287.
- 15 Ibid., p. 361.
- 16 PIKETTY, Thomas; SAEZ, Emmanuel. 2003. **Income inequality in the United States, 1913-1998**. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. 118, n. 1, pp. 1-41.
- 17 SOUZA. 2018, p. 294.
- 18 PAOLI, Maria Célia. 1989. **Trabalhadores e cidadania: experiência do mundo público na história do Brasil moderno**. *Estudos Avançados*, v. 3, n. 7, pp. 40-66.
- 19 SOUZA. 2018, p. 312.
- 20 Id.
- 21 Ibid., p. 317.
- 22 BACHA, Edmar L.; TAYLOR, Lance. 1978. **Brazilian income distribution in the 1960s: Facts’ model results and the controversy**. *The Journal of Development Studies*, v. 14, n. 3, pp. 271-297.
- 23 SOUZA. 2018, p. 315.
- 24 Ibid., p. 328.
- 25 Id.
- 26 Souza stresses that part of the increase in income concentration at the top between 1979 and 1987 may have been a result of the disturbances caused by lack of inflation control. Nevertheless, other evidence – such as the flow of demands repressed during the military dictatorship and the inability to adopt redistributive measures in the period – seem to indicate that this increase in concentration was real. See SOUZA. 2018, p. 364.
- 27 BBC Brasil. 2020.
- 28 As pointed out by Marcelo Medeiros in the introduction to SOUZA. 2018, p. 15.
- 29 BBC Brasil. 2020.
- 30 SILVA, José Afonso da. 2005. **Curso de direito constitucional positivo**. 24<sup>th</sup> ed., Malheiros, São Paulo, p. 350.
- 31 Ibid., p. 353.

- 32 CARVALHO, José Murilo de. 2008. **Cidadania no Brasil: o longo caminho**. 10<sup>th</sup> ed., Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, p. 30.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 CARVALHO. 2008, p. 31.
- 35 CHAIA, Vera. 2010. **A longa conquista do voto na história política brasileira**, p. 2. Available at <https://bit.ly/2H23mlw>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 36 CARVALHO. 2008, p. 39.
- 37 CHAIA. 2010, p. 2.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 CARVALHO. 2008, p. 42.
- 40 Ibid., p. 146.
- 41 CHAIA. 2010, p. 3.
- 42 CARVALHO. 2008, p. 127.
- 43 CHAIA. 2010, p. 3.
- 44 CARVALHO. 2008, p. 146.
- 45 Through Institutional Act No. 1 of April 10, 1964, 102 politicians lost their seats in Congress, including João Goulart and Jânio Quadros, in addition to governors and opposition deputies.
- 46 BERTONCELO, Edison Ricardo Emiliano. 2009. **“Eu quero votar para presidente”: uma análise sobre a Campanha das Diretas**. In: Lua Nova, pp. 169-196, 2009.
- 47 Shortly before João Goulart was ousted from office by the military coup of April 1, 1964, he had proposed to expand the right to vote to illiterate people.
- 48 ARRETCHE, Marta. 2018a. **Democracia e redução da desigualdade econômica no Brasil: a inclusão dos outsiders**. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, v. 33, n. 96, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3hVQB9E>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 49 Ibid., p. 2.
- 50 Ibid., p. 4.
- 51 ARRETCHE, Marta. 2018b. **Anos da Constituição de 1988: Razões para Comemorar?** Novos estudos Cebrap, v. 37, n. 3, pp. 395-414., p. 401. Available at <https://bit.ly/3hVQB9E>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 52 BELTRÃO, Kaizô Iwakami; OLIVEIRA, Francisco Eduardo Barreto de; PINHEIRO, Sonoê Sugahara. 2000. **A população rural e a previdência social no Brasil: uma análise com ênfase nas mudanças constitucionais**, p. 5. Available at <https://bit.ly/3nvFIT8>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 53 BRITO, Alessandra; FOGUEL, Miguel; KERSTENETZKY, Celia. 2017. **The contribution of minimum wage valorization policy to the decline in household income inequality in Brazil: A decomposition approach**. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, v. 40, n. 4, p. 26.
- 54 SILVEIRA, Fernando Gaiger et al. 2011. **Equidade fiscal no Brasil: impactos distributivos da tributação e do gasto social**. Available at <https://bit.ly/3nU1ig7>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 55 Arretche. 2018b, p. 407.
- 56 Ibid., p. 412.
- 57 ALENCAR, Joana et al. 2013. **Participação social e desigualdades nos conselhos nacionais**. Sociologias, v. 15, n. 32, pp. 112.
- 58 LAVALLE, Adrian Gurza. 2011. **Após a participação: nota introdutória**. Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Política, n. 84, pp. 13-23.
- 59 AVRITZER, Leonardo. 2007. **Sociedade civil, instituições participativas e representação: da autorização à legitimidade da ação**. Dados [on-line], vol. 50, n. 3, p. 443.
- 60 The National Education and Health Councils were created in 1911 and 1937, respectively. See MATEOS, Simone Biehler. 2011. **Participação Popular – A construção da democracia participativa**. Ipea – Desafios do Desenvolvimento, May 5, 2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/39Cxm3h>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 61 Through Institutional Act No. 5 (IA-5) of December 13, 1968, which gave the President authority to take – federal, state and municipal – lawmakers’ seats in Congress; suspend citizens’ political rights; dismiss or remove judges; dismiss, remove and force public officials into retirement; and declare unrestricted state of siege; among others. IA-5 even cancelled the right to habeas corpus for politically motivated crimes, established censorship over the press and other media, and outlawed political meetings not authorized by the police.
- 62 KUSHNIR, Beatriz. 2015. **Cães de guarda: jornalistas e censores, do AI-5 à Constituição de 1988**. Boitempo Editorial: São Paulo.
- 63 AVRITZER, Leonardo. 2002. **Modelos de deliberação democrática: uma análise do orçamento participativo no Brasil**. In: SANTOS, B. de S. [Ed.]. Democratizar a democracia. Rio de Janeiro: Record, v. 1, p. 443.



- 64 ROCHA, Enid; VAZ, Flavio Tonelli; MUSSE, Juliano Sander; SANTOS, Rodolfo Fonseca (Eds.). 2008. **A Constituição Cidadã e a institucionalização dos espaços de participação social: avanços e desafios**. In: 20 anos da constituição cidadã: avaliação e desafio da seguridade social, Anfip, Brasília, p. 139.
- 65 CICONELLO, Alexandre. 2008. **A participação social como processo de consolidação da democracia no Brasil. From poverty to power**, p. 4. Available at <https://bit.ly/3dyDslx>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 PIMENTEL, Matheus. 2018. **O que são conselhos nacionais de políticas públicas. E qual seu papel**. In: Nexo Jornal, December 12, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/2FAuS9h>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 68 RIBEIRO, Jefferson Davidson Gomes et al. 2017. **Representação da sociedade civil nos conselhos e comissões nacionais: relatório de pesquisa**. Ipea, Brasília, p. 12. Available at <https://bit.ly/3nX6Nuz>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 PIMENTEL. 2018.
- 72 CICONELLO. 2008, p. 6.
- 73 POGREBINSCHI, T. et al. 2010. **Entre representação e participação: as conferências nacionais e o experimentalismo democrático brasileiro**. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), p. 84.
- 74 AVRITZER, Leonardo. 2012. **Conferências nacionais: ampliando e redefinindo os padrões de participação social no Brasil**. Ipea, Brasília, p. 5.
- 75 DE AVELINO, Daniel Pitangueira; GOULIN, Letícia Volpi. 2018. **Base de dados sobre conferências nacionais e um ensaio de análise lexical por contexto**. Text for Discussion, p. 16. Available at <https://bit.ly/3nJJ6Vr>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 76 AVRITZER. 2012, p. 8.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 CICONELLO. 2008, p. 3.
- 79 The participatory budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre (RS), in turn, was based on a pioneering experience implemented in 1983 through program *Todo Poder Emana do Povo*, in Pelotas (RS).
- 80 DIAS, Nelson; ENRÍQUEZ, Sahsil and SIMONE, Júlio (Eds.). 2019. **Atlas Mundial dos Orçamentos Participativos**. Portugal. Available at <https://bit.ly/3dzyNjh>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 81 Ibid., p. 37.
- 82 OLIVEIRA, Valéria Rezende de. 2013. **Participação social nos planos plurianuais do governo federal: uma história recente**. In: Revista Brasileira de Planejamento e Orçamento, Brasília, v. 3, n. 1, 2013. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Vsslwv>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 83 BANDNEWS. 2018. **Bolsonaro: Vamos botar ponto final em todos os ativismos do Brasil**. October 7, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/31g2y0Y>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 84 CONECTAS DIREITOS HUMANOS. 2018. **Cerca de 3 mil entidades repudiam Bolsonaro por fala sobre fim do ativismo no Brasil**. October 18, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3k7eFr8>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 85 Executive Order 9759 of April 11, 2019.
- 86 PIMENTEL, Matheus. 2019. **O alcance do decreto que mira conselhos de participação**. In: Nexo Jornal, April 16, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/3j0nW2Q>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 87 Executive Order 8243 of May 23, 2014.
- 88 CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. 2019. **Extinto pelo governo, Consea é essencial para combate à fome, diz Nações Unidas**. April 25, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/2T2UdvK>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 89 FREITAS E SOUZA, Maciana. 2019. **O que é o Consea e o que significa seu desmonte?** In: Justificando, January 7, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/3j0Tci8>. Accessed July 29, 2021; GONZALEZ, Amelia. 2019. **Estão desmontando o Sistema de Segurança Alimentar, diz ex-presidente do Consea**. In: 61, January 7, 2019. Available at <https://glo.bo/3j5KEGI>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 90 The National Council for Food and Nutritional Security (Consea) was an immediate advisory body to the Presidency, part of the National System for Food and Nutritional Security (Sisan). With 60 members – two-thirds of civil society representatives and one third of government representatives – the Chairperson of the Council was a representative of civil society chosen among its members and appointed by the President. The agency's prerogatives include social control and the participation of society in making, monitoring and evaluating public policies on food and nutritional security, with a view to promoting the progressive realization of the Human Right to Adequate Food included in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations (UN) in collaboration with other Sisan bodies.
- 91 LEÃO, Marília; MALUF, Renato S. 2012. **A construção social de um sistema público de segurança alimentar e nutricional: a experiência brasileira**. Brasília: Ação Brasileira pela Nutrição e Direitos Humanos, 2012. Available at <https://bit.ly/37trBxt>. Accessed July 29, 2021.

- 92 G1. 2020b. **Rosa Weber suspende decisão do Conama que revogou proteção a manguezais e restingas.** October 29, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/37AGdAe>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 93 Rede Pensann. 2021.
- 94 COMISSÃO INTERAMERICANA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS – CIDH. 2021. **Situação dos direitos humanos no Brasil.** February 12, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3A9ISyh>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 95 SOUZA, Maciana Freitas e. 2019. **O desmonte no Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente.** In: *Justificando*, September 9, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/2LIDDk2>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 96 SILVEIRA, Evanildo da. 2020. **Novo Conama completará um ano esvaziado e sem se reunir.** In: *O Eco*, March 31, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/37kSt9v>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 97 REIS, Sofia. 2020. **Conama derruba resoluções que restringiam o desmatamento em manguezais e restingas.** In: G1, September 28, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/2FB4CLQ>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 98 ALENCAR, Joana et al. 2013. **Participação social e desigualdades nos conselhos nacionais.** *Sociologias*, v. 15, n. 32, pp. 112-146.
- 99 SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. 2020. **Restabelecidas normas do Conama sobre áreas de proteção e licenciamento.** October 29, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/2XDHstv>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 100 MATOSO, Filipe. 2015. **Dilma sanciona reforma política, mas veta doação de empresa a campanha.** In: G1, September 29, 2015. Available at <https://glo.bo/36yJh0l>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 101 Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 4650.
- 102 RAMALHO, Renan. 2015. **Supremo proíbe doação de empresas para campanhas eleitorais.** In: G1, September 17, 2015. Available at <https://glo.bo/36w6QH8>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 103 According to Art. 23, item 1 of Law 13165 of September 29, 2015.
- 104 According to Art. 23, item 2-A of Law 9504 of September 30, 1997, with content from Law 13878 of October 3, 2019.
- 105 NOVA CANA. 2018a. **Rubens Ometto, da Cosan, é o maior doador individual das eleições 2018.** September 21, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/2JHRy9i>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 106 NOVA CANA. 2018b. **A bancada de Rubens Ometto: 25 candidatos que receberam doações em 2018 foram eleitos.** October 23, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3qkjPDL>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 107 VENTURINI, Lilian. 2016. **Tempo de campanha menor prejudica eleitor, diz ministro do TSE.** In: *Nexo Jornal*, September 25, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mE7Tdz>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 108 Available at <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 109 ARAÚJO, Clara. 1998. **Mulheres e representação política: a experiência das cotas no Brasil.** *Estudos feministas*, pp. 71-90.
- 110 FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO. 2020. **Partidos admitem uso de candidatas laranjas e tentam se blindar para as eleições.** September 8, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/340Xkdf>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 111 INSTITUTO ALZIRAS. 2020. **Perfil das Prefeitas no Brasil (2017-2020).** Available at <https://bit.ly/350wgw2>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 112 INESC. 2014. **Perfil dos candidatos às eleições 2014 — Sub-representação de negros, indígenas e mulheres: Desafios à democracia.** Available at <https://bit.ly/37hTj6R>. Accessed July 29, 2021; CAMPOS, Luiz Augusto; MACHADO, Carlos. 2015. **A cor dos eleitos: determinantes da sub-representação política dos não brancos no Brasil.** In: *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política*, n. 16, pp. 121-151; CARTA CAPITAL. 2016. **O retrato da política brasileira: branca, masculina e proprietária.** October 5, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/3jaAnZV>. Accessed July 29, 2021; CAMPOS, Luiz Augusto. 2020. **Por que precisamos de mais negros e negras na política?** In: *El País Brasil*. September 1, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3i5AKPz>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 113 CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. 2018b. **Número de deputados negros cresce quase 5%.** October 8, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3g7ymh2>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 114 OLIVEIRA, Mayara. 2019b. **Parlamentares pretas ou pardas são apenas 2,36% do Congresso.** In: *Metrópoles*, December 10, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mxntaS>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 115 CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. 2018b. **Número de deputados negros cresce quase 5%.** December 8, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3g7ymh2>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 116 OLIVETO, Paloma. 2018. **Sub-representada, bancada de mulheres negras crescerá 30% em 2019.** In: *Correio Braziliense*, October 20, 2019. Available at <https://bit.ly/3m0sMPo>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 117 JUCÁ, Beatriz. 2018. **Como a primeira mulher indígena conquistou uma vaga na Câmara Federal.** In: *El País*, October 10, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/31rLc3Y>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 118 Em 2018, dois terços das cadeiras do Senado Federal (54) foram renovadas.

- 119 EBC. 2016. **Seis indígenas são eleitos para o cargo de prefeito no primeiro turno.** October 6, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/31u5R7b>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 120 FERNANDES, Marcella. 2018. **Mulheres negras ou pardas são apenas 3% de todos prefeitos, revela estudo.** In: HuffPost Brasil, July 25, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/34ljhV1>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 121 Ibid.
- 122 DE OLHO NOS RURALISTAS. 2016. **Número de vereadores indígenas aumenta 30%; PT e PSDB elege mais.** October 5, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/3oapnzD>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 123 TSE. 2018. **Eleições 2016: país elege 7.803 vereadoras e 638 prefeitos em primeiro turno.** October 10, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/3dKIlb4>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 124 GÊNERO E NÚMERO. 2016. **Com vitórias marcantes na vereança, mulheres seguem sub-representadas após primeiro turno.** October 5, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/2ThcZ2w>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 125 CABALLERO, Miguel. 2016. **Da Maré, Marielle Franco chega à Câmara como a quinta mais votada.** In: Jornal O Globo October 4, 2016. Available at <https://glo.bo/2TgG6CQ>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 126 OXFAM BRASIL. 2018b. **Nota da Oxfam Brasil sobre o assassinato da vereadora Marielle Franco.** March 16, 2018. Available at <https://bit.ly/3g9bs9o>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 127 FERREIRA, Lola. 2020. **Mulheres negras são alvo de violência política em ano eleitoral e buscaram soluções para ataques cada vez sofisticados.** In: Gênero e Número, August 27, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/2VuPNPr>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 128 RODRIGUES, Cristiano. 2020. **Afro-Latinos em Movimento: Protesto Negro e Ativismo Institucional no Brasil e na Colômbia.** Editora Appris, Curitiba, 2020.
- 129 RIOS, Flavia; PEREIRA, Ana Claudia; RANGEL, Patrícia. 2017. **Paradoxo da igualdade: gênero, raça e democracia.** Ciência e Cultura, v. 69, n. 1, p. 39.
- 130 Campos. 2020.
- 131 Campos & Machado. 2015.
- 132 LEMOS, Leany Barreiro; MARCELINO, Daniel; PEDERIVA, João Henrique. 2010. **Porque dinheiro importa: a dinâmica das contribuições eleitorais para o Congresso Nacional em 2002 e 2006.** Opinião pública, v. 16, n. 2, pp. 366-39; SILVA, Bruno Fernando da; CERVI, Emerson Urizzi. 2017. **Padrões de financiamento eleitoral no Brasil: as receitas de postulantes à Câmara dos Deputados em 2010 e 2014.** Revista Brasileira de Ciência e Política, Brasília, n. 23, pp. 75-110.
- 133 GAXIE, Daniel. 2012. **As lógicas do recrutamento político.** *Revista Brasileira de Ciência e Política*, Brasília, n. 8, pp. 165-208.
- 134 CAMPOS, Luiz Augusto; MACHADO, Carlos. 2017. **O que afasta pretos e pardos da representação política? Uma análise a partir das eleições legislativas de 2014.** In: *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, v. 25, n. 61, pp. 125-142.
- 135 Ibid.
- 136 FRANCO, Anielle (2020). **Está nas mãos do TSE promover eleições antirracistas.** In: *El País Brasil*, August 14, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3dLuDVo>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 137 CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. 2020. **Projeto prevê cota mínima de candidatos negros nas eleições para o Poder Legislativo.** August 10, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/2HniI16>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 138 BARBIERI, Catarina Helena Cortada et al. 2019. **Democracia e representação nas eleições de 2018: campanhas eleitorais, financiamento e diversidade de gênero: relatório final (2018-2019).** Centro de Pesquisa Jurídica Aplicada (CPJA). Available at <https://bit.ly/2Tif8uN>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 139 Ibid., p. 75.
- 140 TSE. 2020. **Divisão do Fundo Eleitoral e do tempo de TV deve ser proporcional ao total de candidatos negros, decide TSE.** August 25, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3odJZa7>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 141 BRASIL DE FATO. 2020. **Plataforma pede distribuição proporcional do fundo eleitoral para candidaturas negras.** July 20, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3jdWNJS>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 142 VALENTE, Fernanda. 2020a. **Lewandowski manda aplicar incentivos para candidatos negros já nestas eleições.** In: *Consultor Jurídico*, September 10, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3m7IhV0>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 143 VALENTE, Fernanda. 2020b. **Incentivos para candidatos negros deverão ser aplicados já nesta eleição, diz STF.** In: *Consultor Jurídico*, October 3, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3oiQhFA>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 144 FRANCO, Daniele. 2020b. **O novo normal: Eleições 2020 em meio à pandemia de covid-19.** In: *O Tempo*, October 13, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/36zyHWW>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 145 Emenda Constitucional nº 107, de 2 de julho de 2020. See CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. 2020b. **Câmara aprova adiamento das eleições municipais para novembro; PEC será promulgada nesta quinta.** July 1, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/2JKemFa>. Accessed July 29, 2021.

- 146 BRAGON, Ranier; GARCIA, Guilherme; FARIA, Flávia. 2020. **Homem branco é o candidato padrão a prefeito nas 95 maiores cidades do país.** In: Folha de S.Paulo, October 10, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/2TdU9ZR>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 147 IG. 2020a. **TSE indica recorde de candidatos negros e mulheres em 2020.** Available at <https://bit.ly/31s4ZzV>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 148 JARDIM, Luiza; BRAGATTO, Rachel Callai. 2020. **Em eleição de maioria negra, partidos investem mais nos homens brancos.** In: Observatório das Eleições, October 21, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/34kY4dT>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 149 BRAGON, Ranier; GARCIA, Guilherme; FARIA, Flávia. 2020. **Homem branco é o candidato padrão a prefeito nas 95 maiores cidades do país.** In: Folha de S.Paulo, October 13, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/2TdU9ZR>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 150 BRAGON, Ranier. 2020. **Cidade de São Paulo tem 74% do dinheiro público de campanha na mão de candidatos brancos.** In: Folha de S.Paulo, November 12, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mFdiRw>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 151 ZIGONI, Carmela. 2020. **Eleições 2020: candidaturas negras disputam em condições de extrema desigualdade.** In: O Estado de S. Paulo, October 31, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/2VytUi3>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 152 Ibid.
- 153 BRAGON, Ranier; GARCIA, Guilherme; YUKARI, Diana. 2020. **Menos de 1% dos candidatos concentram 80% dos fundos públicos de campanha.** In: Folha de S.Paulo, October 25, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Vx7ZHU>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 154 GERALDO, Nathália. 2020. **Eleições: por que algumas mulheres negras estão em candidaturas coletivas?** In: Universa UOL, October 10, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mcgPGA>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 155 DIÁRIO DE GOIÁS. 2016. **Grupo é eleito para "mandato coletivo" de vereador em Goiás.** October 12, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/2TgU47W>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 156 Available at <https://gabinetona.org/site/>.
- 157 Available at <https://www.bancadaativista.org/>.
- 158 Available at <https://www.juntacodeputadas.com.br/>.
- 159 MADER, Helena. 2020. **Defesa do feminismo, dos livros e da maconha: as causas das 331 candidaturas coletivas.** In: Revista Crusoé, 28.09.2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3km61F4>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 160 IG. 2020b. **Candidaturas coletivas: entenda o fenômeno político que não para de crescer.** October 18, 2016. Available at <https://bit.ly/34oqCU1>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 161 G1. 2020. **PSOL oficializa candidatura coletiva à Prefeitura de Natal.** September 14, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/2T-mu3Ux>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 162 GIOVANAZ, Daniel. 2020. **Mandatos coletivos oxigenam casas legislativas e expõem necessidade de regulamentação.** In: Brasil de Fato, November 22, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/39EpP49>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 163 FRANCO, Marcella. 2020c. **Professora eleita vereadora quer combate ao machismo em "gabinete" de bancada feminista na Câmara de São Paulo.** In: Folha de S.Paulo, November 17, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3g6u8pY>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 164 FRANCO, Marcella. 2020d. **Quilombo Periférico chega à Câmara de SP sob o lema da disposição do arroz e feijão.** In: Folha de S.Paulo, November 20, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3m-D0xXH>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 165 DUARTE, Catarina. 2020. **Cinco mulheres formam o primeiro mandato coletivo de Florianópolis.** In: ND+, November 16, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3oibRsT>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 166 VIANA, Theyse. 2020. **Mulheres da periferia elegem 1º mandato coletivo de Fortaleza.** In: G1, November 16, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/3mDuzw1>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 167 A TARDE. 2020. **Câmara recebe formato inédito de candidatura coletiva em 2021 com "Pretas por Salvador".** November 18, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3g7P6Vy>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 168 REVISTA CLÁUDIA. 2020. **Apesar de cotas, homens e brancos ainda são maioria entre os eleitos.** November 30, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mHrpFZ>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 169 Ibid.
- 170 MATOS, Thaís. 2020. **Candidatas saem derrotadas no 2º turno, e país terá apenas uma capital governada por uma mulher.** In: G1, November 29, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/3mEHso1>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 171 CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. 2020c. **Mulheres representam 16% dos vereadores eleitos no País.** November 17, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/39ErXJ7>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 172 TSE. 2020c. **Mulheres representam apenas 12% dos prefeitos eleitos no 1º turno das Eleições 2020.** November 24, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/2VwCk9G>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 173 BAPTISTA, Rodrigo. 2020. **Brasil tem mais negros eleitos, mas sub-representação permanece.** In: Agência Senado, November 18, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3g5SaBD>. Accessed July 29, 2021.

- 174 VELASCO, Clara. 2020. **Mesmo com aumento das candidaturas negras, Câmaras municipais seguem com maioria branca no país**. In: G1, November 17, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/3mEmqK>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 175 GÊNERO E NÚMERO. 2020. **Negros serão 44% dos vereadores nas capitais brasileiras em 2021**. November 16, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/36EX5qe>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 176 Amapá's state capital Macapá did not hold municipal elections on regular dates because the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) suspended them due to an electricity supply crisis in the state.
- 177 While no black person has been elected for its City Council, Florianópolis (SC) was one of the state capitals that elected collective candidacies — the *Bem Viver* Collective. Even though they were officially represented on the ballot by a white woman — educator Cíntia Mendonça — they include two black women and one indigenous woman. About this debate, see Giovanaz (2020).
- 178 CORREA, Suzana. 2020. **Erika Hilton: Como a afro-transsexual da periferia tornou-se a mulher mais votada do Brasil**. In: *Jornal O Globo*, November 24, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/2JJPJHqk>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 179 OLIVEIRA, Joana. 2020. **Erika Hilton: "Este é o país dos paradoxos, que elege mulheres negras e tem homens negros assassinados"**. In: *El País Brasil*, November 23, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mSDs3H>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 180 TV CULTURA. 2021. **Erika Hilton é eleita presidente da Comissão de Direitos Humanos da Câmara dos Vereadores de SP**. March 23, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/2UP5IQN>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 181 Karen Santos (PSOL). See GOMES, Luís Eduardo. 2020. **Karen Santos: de um movimento que cabia num elevador a vereadora mais votada de Porto Alegre**. In: *Sul21*, November 17, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Jz0491>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 182 Dani Portela (PSOL). See JORNAL DO COMÉRCIO. 2020. **Dani Portela é a vereadora eleita com mais votos no Recife**. November 1, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/39HrRRe>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 183 Dra. Michelle (PDT). See VITOR, Lucas. 2020. **Dra. Michelle é a mais votada para vereadora em Rio Branco; veja a lista dos 17 eleitos**. In: *Acre 24 horas*, November 15, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/37ySlBB>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 184 Thainara Faria (PT). See A CIDADE ON. 2020. **'Entenderam o que o nosso mandato representava', diz Thainara Faria**. November 16, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3qnnck9>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 185 Duda Salabert (PDT). See GIRUNDI, Danilo. 2020. **"Vitória dos direitos humanos", diz 1ª vereadora trans e a mais votada da história de Belo Horizonte**. In: G1, November 16, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/3lFKXcK>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 186 Linda Brasil (PSOL). See CARVALHO, Ketryn. 2020. **Linda Brasil é a primeira mulher trans eleita vereadora em Aracaju**. In: B0L, November 16, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3m6Jmon>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 187 FONTANA, Guilherme. 2020. **Quem são os vereadores trans eleitos em 2020**. In: G1, November 20, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/2L7tbT6>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 188 Carol Dartora (PT). See YANO, Célio. 2020. **Carol Dartora quer combater invisibilidade e preconceito: "Somos negros de Curitiba, sim"**. In: *Gazeta do Povo*, December 2, 2020. Available at <https://bit.ly/3mGSPMe>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 189 Camila Valadão (PSOL). See MENDONÇA, Maíra. 2020. **Câmara de Vitória terá primeira vereadora negra**. In: G1, November 16, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/3qnKHH>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 190 Jô Oliveira (PCdoB). See CALDAS, Felipe. 2020. **Vinda do movimento estudantil, Jô Oliveira é a primeira negra eleita vereadora de Campina Grande**. In: G1, November 17, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/2JPKxmY>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 191 REVISTA GALILEU. 2020. **Representatividade indígena e quilombola cresce nas eleições de 2020**. November 19, 2020. Available at <https://glo.bo/3lG4qtR>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 192 Available at <https://bit.ly/3hEDWsA>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 193 Available at <https://bit.ly/2UoQEUY>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 194 Available at <https://bit.ly/3hU70wz>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 195 Addition 3 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3dP36no>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 196 Addition 6 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3qMB1Ce>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 197 Addition 1 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3hBsq13>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 198 Addition 4 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3j0bUxE>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 199 Addition 4 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3ysoWoE>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 200 REQ. 33/2021 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/36mJ8Ml>. Accessed July 29, 2021.

- 201 Addition 5 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3Avu1hl>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 202 Addition 7 to Constitutional Amendment Proposal 125/2011. Available at <https://bit.ly/3AusjNH>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 203 AMADO, Guilherme. 2021. **Proposta de reforma eleitoral quer diminuir transparência de gastos de candidatos**. In: Metrôpoles, July 1, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/2TLCEE9>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 204 BRANT, Danielle & BRAGON, Ranier. 2021. **Câmara quer censurar divulgação de pesquisas eleitorais e exigir taxa de acerto de resultados**. In: Folha de S.Paulo, July 6, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3hKX2x4>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 205 DI CUNTO, Raphael. 2021. **Reforma com 878 artigos muda de eleição a 'fake news'**. In: Valor Econômico, June 23, 2021. Available at <https://glo.bo/3yida0g>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 206 ISSA, Marcelo & STEIBEL, Fabro. 2021. **O tsunami eleitoral por trás da CPI da covid**. In: Folha de S.Paulo, July 2, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3yy1WUW>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 207 CLAVERY, Elisa. 2021. **Câmara decide usar proposta de 2011 para queimar etapas e tentar mudar sistema eleitoral**. In: G1, April 7, 2021. Available at <https://glo.bo/3ABSdif>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 208 MELLO, Bernardo. 2021. **Com distritão, Câmara teria aumento de homens brancos, mais velhos e reeleitos, aponta levantamento**. In: Jornal O Globo, July, 5 2021. Available at <https://glo.bo/3hHimUj>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 209 AFLALO, Hannah Maruci. 2021. **O distritão é um projeto de (manutenção) do poder**. In: O Estado de S. Paulo, June 22, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3AA1g3g>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 210 Id.
- 211 FRENTE PELO AVANÇO DOS DIREITOS POLÍTICOS DAS MULHERES – FADPM. 2021. **O que está em jogo para as mulheres na nova Proposta de Reforma Eleitoral? Nota Técnica nº 2**. Available at <https://bit.ly/3dQIP5k>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 212 WALTERBERG, Guilherme. 2021. **Reforma política deve diminuir candidatos e criar cota feminina, diz presidente da comissão**. In: Poder360, June 12, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3wsLnZg>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 213 FADPM. 2021.
- 214 MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL – MPF. 2021. **Mulheres na política: nota técnica analisa reserva de 15% de assentos nas casas legislativas**. June 29, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/36hqKoe>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 215 ARAÚJO, Clara; FABRIS, Ligia & FERRETI, Michelle. 2021. **A reforma política e os mitos sobre a participação política de mulheres: Simulações sobre os 15% de reserva de cadeiras e seus efeitos nos parlamentos proporcionais do Brasil**. Nota Técnica nº 1 - Fórum Fluminense Mais Mulheres na Política. Available at <https://bit.ly/2Uy3X4P>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 216 Ibid., p. 3.
- 217 Ibid., p. 6.
- 218 Ibid., p. 10.
- 219 FADPM. 2021, p. 8.
- 220 ARAÚJO, FABRIS & FERRETI. 2021, p. 16.
- 221 FADPM. 2021, p. 7.
- 222 Available at <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus>. Accessed June 28, 2021.
- 223 ADEGUNSOYE, Ayodeji; VENTURA, Iazsmin Bauer; LIARSKI, Vladimir M. 2020. **Association of Black Race with Outcomes in COVID-19 Disease: A Retrospective Cohort Study**. Annals of the American Thoracic Society, v. 17, n. 10, pp. 1336-1339.
- 224 BERTONI, Estêvão. 2021. **Ministério paralelo da Saúde: qual o problema de sua existência**. In: Nexo Jornal, June 7, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3AbyXYS>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 225 FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO. 2021. **'Não se tratava de ideologia, era o velho esquema de corrupção', diz Randolfe sobre caso Covaxin**. June 28, 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3Aef9UL>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 226 OXFAM BRASIL, INSTITUTO ALZIRAS & INSTITUTO MARIELLE FRANCO. 2021. **Carta Preta – A Política Que Queremos**. July 2021. Available at <https://bit.ly/3qDxR3T>. Accessed July 29, 2021.
- 227 Organized by Oxfam Brasil with Instituto Alziras and Instituto Marielle Franco, with support from the European Union and the City of Barcelona (ESP), *Jornada das Pretas 2021* took place on April 30 and May 4 and 8 of 2021, for exchanging knowledge and practices, in addition to systematizing experiences of political participation by black women in elections in Brazil. More information at <https://bit.ly/3wmAb0g>.
- 228 OXFAM BRASIL, INSTITUTO ALZIRAS & INSTITUTO MARIELLE FRANCO. 2021, p. 2.
- 229 Ibid.
- 230 Ibid., p. 4.

## ABOUT OXFAM BRASIL

Oxfam Brasil is a Brazilian civil society organization, founded in 2014 and beginning its operations in 2015, which mission is to contribute to the reduction of social injustices and inequalities of income, wealth, gender and race for the construction of a country with more justice and less inequalities.

The organization operates in three thematic areas in Brazil: Rural Justice and Development; Racial and Gender Justice; and Social and Economic Justice. Among the strategies of activities are working in partnership and alliance with other organizations and sectors of Brazilian civil society, public engagement, campaigning and advocacy with public and private sectors.

Oxfam Brasil has a deliberative council, a fiscal council and a general assembly formed by Brazilians - and it is a Brazilian, non-profit and independent organization. Our office is located in São Paulo.

We are part of a global network, the Oxfam Confederation, which has 21 members, working in more than 90 countries around the world, through campaigns, programs and humanitarian aid.

For us, inequalities means giving people space, voice and power so that they can fully exercise their rights and contribute to building a fairer and less unequal country.

### #MoreJusticeLessInequalities

Oxfam África do Sul ([www.oxfam.org.za](http://www.oxfam.org.za))

Oxfam Alemanha ([www.oxfam.de](http://www.oxfam.de))

Oxfam América ([www.oxfamamerica.org](http://www.oxfamamerica.org))

Oxfam Austrália ([www.oxfam.org.au](http://www.oxfam.org.au))

Oxfam Bélgica ([www.oxfam.be](http://www.oxfam.be))

Oxfam Brasil ([www.oxfam.org.br](http://www.oxfam.org.br))

Oxfam Canadá ([www.oxfam.ca](http://www.oxfam.ca))

Oxfam Colômbia (<https://lac.oxfam.org/countries/colombia>)

Oxfam México ([www.oxfamMexico.org](http://www.oxfamMexico.org))

Oxfam Itália ([www.oxfamitalia.org](http://www.oxfamitalia.org))

Oxfam Grã Bretanha ([www.oxfam.org.uk](http://www.oxfam.org.uk))

Oxfam França ([www.oxfamfrance.org](http://www.oxfamfrance.org))

Oxfam Irlanda ([www.oxfamireland.org](http://www.oxfamireland.org))

Oxfam Nova Zelândia ([www.oxfam.org.nz](http://www.oxfam.org.nz))

Oxfam Índia ([www.oxfamindia.org](http://www.oxfamindia.org))

Oxfam Novib (Países Baixos) ([www.oxfamnovib.nl](http://www.oxfamnovib.nl))

Oxfam Intermón (Espanha) ([www.oxfamintermon.org](http://www.oxfamintermon.org))

Oxfam Hong Kong ([www.oxfam.org.hk](http://www.oxfam.org.hk))

Oxfam Íbis (Dinamarca) ([www.oxfamibis.dk](http://www.oxfamibis.dk))

Oxfam KEDV (Turquia) (<https://www.kedv.org.tr>)





**OXFAM BRASIL**

Avenida Pedroso de Moraes, 272 - 8º andar  
Pinheiros - São Paulo - SP - Brasil - CEP 05420-000  
(11) 3811-0400

[www.oxfam.org.br](http://www.oxfam.org.br)